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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS



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ALBANIA

PARTY POLICY ON ACCEPTING NEW MEMBERS EXPLAINED

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 28 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Kudret Topciu: "The Policy of the Party on Increasing Its Ranks--A Scientific and Marxist-Leninist Policy]

[Text] The increase and rejuvenation of the party ranks, as a dialectical process, is decisive for its existence. Therefore, our party has considered and pursued this issue with particular concern. And, thus, the party membership has been increased year after year in number and improved in the quality of its communists. In the First Congress the party was represented by 29,000 communists while today there are more than 4 and 1/2 times more communists in its ranks. This increase has been carried out in a scientific manner, persistently implementing the Marxist-Leninist line and the correct revolutionary criteria. In this way, the party has been strengthened and has continually improved the effectiveness of its work.

The quality of accepting people in the party has been and remains decisive in the party policy on accepting new members. The First Resolution of the Constituent Assembly of the communist groups it has been stressed as a special point "the party ranks must be reinforced at once with new forces, with vigorous militants, workers and farmers recruited among the poor people of cities and villages. We must remove once and for all the fear and sectarianism in the process of accepting in the party the vigorous elements of workers and villagers. Cells must emerge from the workers' movement from which the true leaders of the party emerge." Precisely, because it accepted vigorous and most devoted elements in its ranks, precisely because it gathered the patriotic people around them, the party successfully led the struggle; and, not only the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Struggle. During these 40 years of the most heroic struggle for the construction of socialism, the party successfully confronted all situations because it maintained the purity of its ranks, purging them from fearful, unreliable and hostile elements and increasing their ranks with the best elements of the party.

The party has always seen the issue of increasing its ranks and, especially, the quality of admission to the party, with particular vigilance. In a letter to the Tirana Party Committee in November 1943, Comrade Enver had stressed: "On the other hand, we must not be sectarian in recruiting new elements for party membership; nevertheless, you must not admit no longer

40 and 50 members to the party at the same time and you must not admit improperly checked and tested elements." The emphasis which the party has placed time after time on the struggle against conservatism, sectarianism and so forth have never been considered in the party policy on admissions as being detached from the struggle against the manifestations of opportunism, liberalism and so forth that affect and endanger the ranks of the party.

Comrade Enver stressed again, at the Eighth Party Congress, that: "The quality of the people admitted to the party has been and is decisive in the party policy regarding the increase of its ranks. Nobody should be accepted into the party simply because he is the son of a worker, farmer or communist and because of the merits of his mother and father; on the contrary, he must be admitted because of his own merits, quality and capacities." Every manifestation of simplification [regarding admissions] leads to bureaucracy and liberalism.

For increasing its ranks, the party has pursued and executed, in a creative manner and with scientific criteria, the Marxist-Leninist line embodied in the party Statute and in the guidelines, directives and orders of its Central Committee. For their understanding and implementation, the party has worked carefully so that they will be assimilated by every basic party organization and every communist.

The basic party organization, as is known, is the foundation of the party. It is written in the Statute that "The issue of admission to the party is discussed and settled in the meeting of the basic party organizations." The party committee approves or rejects the decision of the basic party organization. All Central Committee orders have, in essence, analyzed and made concrete this Marxist-Leninist, principled and organizational issue. And, the decision of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee in 1982 on improving the procedure for admission in the Party, in essence, further expands and increases the responsibility and tasks of the basic party organization in regard to this purpose. Every misunderstanding and lack of clarity in this matter would be of harmful consequences.

Experience shows that admissions to the party proceed properly in all indicators where and when the basic party organizations and the communists work well. Nevertheless, there are cases of criticizable attitudes and manifestations of shallow and narrow-minded understanding of the guidelines, of criteria and of the orders that affect the quality of admissions and lead to bureaucracy. Thus, while almost in every case there is concern for the social formation of the party, for the origin and social conditions of the persons admitted and for their family milieu and relatives, there are basic party organizations and commendable communists that do not execute this properly on all qualitative indicators required for admission to the party. There are among them people who satisfy themselves with minimal requirements, failing to examine, with great concern and responsibility, all the data of work and of behavior in work centers and outside them and in families, city quarters, schools, army and so forth in order to make a careful examination. Therefore, it happens that in some cases the party committees do not approve decisions adopted by basic party organizations or that some candidates for party membership are excluded from apprenticeship.

For our party the manifestations of bureaucracy and formalism in relations to new admissions to the party have been and are foreign manifestations; however, in this field, the struggle must be kept alive on a continuing basis because there is not lack of manifestations deserving criticism. These include, for example, cases when a younger average age for admission is not considered properly and when requests for admission are not considered in unison with all other personal data of the person who seeks to be admitted, so that the quality of admissions and the younger age, which is very important to keep the party always young in age, will be absolutely assured. Cases when one formally demands and "insists" on getting the opinion of the collective about the person who will be admitted to the party are signs of bureaucratic concepts and attitudes. It is a manifestation of these attitudes when, sometimes, the right of the youth organization to recommend people is under protection by the basic party organizations and, especially, their secretaries; thus, the initiative and self action of the youth organizations is twisted. The youth must continually present their requests, the youth organizations must persistently recommend them and the party will judge everything, selecting the best elements on the basis of criteria, guidelines and studies carried out for this purpose.

But, other manifestations such as sectarianism and conservatism, have not been eliminated. You cannot fail to hear, in some basic party organizations and among communists, that "there are no suitable elements." Some party committees, such as in Diber, Elbasan, Korce and elsewhere, ascertain in their analyses that there are basic party organizations which, although they are in need, have not had any admissions to the party, some of them for 2 to 3 years in a row. The policy of the party on increasing its ranks is a scientific policy requiring concern, attention and greater work and better management. As such, the party does not tolerate, as sometimes happens, that admissions be made as they come, in general and according to the number, just to conform to the study without giving the necessary attention to accepting the number needed and where they are needed, first of all, in the main and most important sectors and work fronts of production, where it interests the party. And there is avoidance on their part when it amounts to progressing with studies and when admissions must be carried out in the most scientific way.

Increasing the number of party members is not an aim itself. It has served and serves the strengthening of the party, the improvement of its leadership role. Every attentive study in this field by the basic party organizations strongly help to achieve a continuing and high-quality increase in the party ranks and the best implementation of the tasks by the party.

9150

CSO: 2100/58

'GOOD NEIGHBOR' POLICY SEEN AS POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 6 Aug 84 p 8

[Article by Viktor Meier datelined Sofia in August: "Slow Change in Bulgaria"]

[Text] No sooner does one cross the Bulgarian border than one perceives the banner above the street: "The Balkans--Zone of Peace." In Sofia, people emphatically point out to the visitor the advantages of peaceful cooperation and of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. One automatically thinks back to the 1950's, another period characterized by slogans of this kind--slogans that upon realistic consideration proved to be unadulterated propaganda, above all propaganda on behalf of others. Today one would no longer readily say this, at least as far as Bulgaria is concerned. For Bulgaria's own interests appear too solidly bound up with the establishment--or maintenance--of peaceable conditions in the Balkans; and Bulgaria's overall conduct in the field of foreign affairs seems wholly to bear out the slogan of "zone of peace" in the Balkans.

In the Communist sphere of influence, there presently are few countries that show positive developmental trends. Besides Hungary, Bulgaria is one of these countries. Not that conditions here could be called paradisiacal: Hungary and--for all its difficulties--Yugoslavia still are materially better off and distinguished by greater openness. Nevertheless, with each successive return visit, one finds that the conversations are more substantial, more realistic and more open. There is more and more articulation of the country's real interests. In many government offices, one now finds younger people holding modern opinions and expressing critical views. The older generation, above all the party leader and head of state, Todor Zhivkov, must be given credit for having allowed and made possible this change of atmosphere. Twenty years ago, such a thing still appeared to be highly unlikely. The work of Ludmila Zhivkova, the president's daughter who died in 1981, is another factor that has left an imprint; since her time, Bulgaria has more and more been opening up to the outside world. Many observers will continue to think that changes in Bulgaria progress rather slowly and do not go as far as do those in Hungary. But impatience is not a national trait of the Bulgarians and the Western observer is well advised to guard against it.

As far as foreign policy is concerned, one can perceive the effects of Bulgaria's national policy even now. Perhaps it really was not that easy to obtain the Soviet Union's approval of the demand for a "nuclear-free zone" in the Balkans--a demand revived by Zhivkov in 1981 on the occasion of the ceremonies commemorating the foundation of the first Bulgarian state 1,300 years ago. We were told in Sofia that people should not concern themselves with the question as to who could claim to have originated this slogan: what mattered was to ensure that political action proceed along these lines.

One may argue--and do so with good reason--that the entire project of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans is unrealistic. But it enables Bulgaria to pursue in the Balkans a policy of neighborly good will and to reject as unnecessary any increase in the military strength of other countries, including the Soviet Union. Since Moscow gave its approval, it finds itself committed to the "policy of peace" in the Balkans; any change--through deployment of conventional weapons or even missiles in Bulgaria--would have to be interpreted as a 180° turn and it would create a new situation for all parties concerned. There is good reason to believe Bulgaria's protestations to the effect that no Soviet missiles are stationed in Bulgaria and that no such stationing is planned. If someday this turned out to be untrue, it would discredit not only Bulgaria's policy, but also the Soviet Union's claim of allowing peaceable neighborly relations in the Balkans.

There are quite a few Western observers who take a skeptical view of Bulgaria's "policy of peace" slogans: they argue that quite recently some strange influences radiated from Bulgaria into the neighboring non-communist states and also into Western countries, above all countries in South Europe. Turkish observers, for example, maintain that during the period preceding the establishment of the Turkish military regime Sofia was a center of activities oriented toward destabilization of Turkey. According to political circles in Ankara, this was attributable not only to Bulgarian initiatives. It appears that certain individuals from Turkey had been active in Sofia for some time, with the "Vitosha" luxury hotel serving as operational center for their evil pursuits. According to Turkish observers, the Turkish arms smuggler Celenk, who allegedly still is imprisoned in Sofia, can be considered to be representative of these people; one should not rule out the possibility that in this murky environment strings were pulled that subsequently converged--in all kinds of roundabout ways--in Rome, at the assassination attempt on the Pope. These observers concede that it would be impossible to prove this.

Of late, discussion of all these circumstances has been stirred up again in the international arena and Bulgaria found much of the effort put forth in the last few years toward creating a better image to be wasted. Recently, Turkish diplomats made an interesting observation. They claim that many of those sinister figures from the period preceding the military regime left Sofia and that some of them can now be seen in the big hotels in Budapest. Whether this will help the Hungarians is another question; from Bulgaria at least they are gone, people say. So far, Turkey had been reserved vis-a-vis Bulgaria's "neighborly" advances; one of the motives underlying this reserve thus could be considered to have been eliminated.

Since in the projected nuclear-free zone in the Balkans it is only the NATO countries Turkey and Greece that have nuclear weapons and since such a zone thus would require unilateral concessions of the West, it would be interesting to see what kind of compensation the Eastern partners would be prepared to offer. We posed this question in Bulgaria's ministry of foreign affairs, but the only answer we were given--in a tone of slight embarrassment--was that this should be left to the "experts." This alone should be sufficient to show that the project probably is no more than a symbol of the--admittedly sincere--desire to be left alone. Turkey opposes the project, since it would not augment Turkey's security. Yugoslavia occasionally pays lip service, but essentially makes it quite plain that above all it is interested in stability in the Balkans and that it is not prepared to support a one-sided change in the distribution of forces. Consequently, the unpredictable activities of Greece's socialist premier, Papandreou, are not to Belgrade's liking. Similarly, Sofia knows that its policy of neighborly good will can succeed only if conditions are stable in all of the Balkans.

The only country that continues to distrust Bulgaria and its present policy is Yugoslavia. In this connection, Sofia circles claim that it is unnecessary for the whole process of affirmation of the new Macedonian nation always to be directed against Bulgaria and that one could not simply rewrite history. But these circles emphatically point out that Bulgaria recognizes the constitutional realities created in Yugoslavia and that it has made formal and public statements to this effect. According to these circles, it is not clear why the Yugoslav premier, Planinc, during her visit to Sofia has called into question just this position of Sofia; for once Yugoslavia should understand that certain realities exist also on the Bulgarian side of the border and that both countries had best refrain from interfering with the affairs of the other country. According to these representatives, Sofia will nevertheless be patient and will assume that the Yugoslav premier felt compelled once again to state for her own public certain things that Belgrade would henceforth disregard in the further development of cooperation.

8760

CSO: 2300/614

PARTY ORGAN CONDEMNS SQUANDERING, THEFT OF STATE PROPERTY

Sofia NOVO VREME in Bulgarian No 7, 1984 pp 30-38

[Article by Prof Dr Vut'o Tsonev: "Safeguarding of Socialist Property the Fundamental Duty of Every Citizen"]

[Text] Socialist society is constructed and develops on the basis of the socialized form of ownership. The subject of the ownership of the means of production is the people in the person of the socialist state. Possession and management are implemented by various economic organizations and labor collectives.

The socialized form of property abolishes the exploitation of man by man. This form of property places citizens in the same status relative to the means of production. The place which every citizen occupies in socialist society is determined by his role in the production process and by what he gives to society.

The development of socialist society and the growth of the people's prosperity are organically dependent on the continuous expansion, growth and augmentation of public property. The realization of the personal interests and rights of citizens under socialism is determined in maximum measure by public interest. Public interest ranks first under socialism and is determinative not only for the prosperity of society as a whole, but also for the individual citizen.

In view of the decisive role of socialist property in the building of socialist society, the socialist state and the party are especially mindful of its safeguarding, development, augmentation and management. One of the basic functions of the socialist state is that of safeguarding socialist property.

The function of safeguarding socialist property must ensure comprehensive and most effective protection of socialist property by the state against all who deliberately or involuntarily destroy or waste, squander or misappropriate public property.

One of the most prevalent ways at present in our country by which considerable harm is done to the national economy is encroachment on socialist property--thefts, embezzlement, etc. State, cooperative and other public goods and chattels are stolen. Property, goods or other valuables are embezzled by persons

entrusted with taking care of them or working on them. "The amounts of the damage from direct encroachments (thefts, unconscionable embezzlement and other criminal cases) are alarming," said Comrade T. Zhivkov in his speech to the July (1976) Plenum.¹

Here are some facts involving encroachment on socialist property such as thefts, embezzlements and other forms of misappropriation. During 1975-1979 the most prevalent crimes were those against socialist property--23.8 percent on the average of all crimes of a general character. More than half of these were thefts of public property, about one-fourth embezzlements, and 11.1 percent document frauds. The data show that direct crimes against socialist property are not declining.

The most prevalent crime in 1981 was criminal encroachment on the socialist economy. Of all crimes of a general character, 31.9 percent had to do with the socialist economy. Of these, 61.0 percent were thefts of public property, 24.4 percent official embezzlements under articles 201-205 of the NK [Criminal Code], and 5.3 percent document frauds under article 212 of the NK. Criminological investigations indicate that the volume of undetected crimes under article 219 of the NK is three times the number of those that end up with a guilty verdict.

These crimes against socialist property read 24.4 percent for 1977, 23.9 percent for 1978, 24.2 percent for 1979, 25.9 percent for 1980, 26 percent for 1981 and 22.9 percent for 1982.

The amount of the sums embezzled by officials also grew. In 1981 it amounted to 3 million leva, while the average amount thereof increased by 52.2 percent over 1979 and by 57.3 percent over 1980.

MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] agencies, people's control commissions, etc., of Turgovishte Okrug in the summer and autumn of 1983 alone prevented 362 encroachments upon people's property valued at over 470,000 leva. This finding is for one okrug only and applies to only two seasons.

Another and perhaps most prevalent way in which maximum damage is done to the national economy is an uneconomic attitude towards public property. Very often raw materials, supplies and finished products of industry are left out in the open, in the rain, snow, wind and sun, with no measures taken to protect them. In agriculture, the uneconomic attitude towards finished products is greater still. Sometimes tons of picked fruit remain in the field, with no care taken to save it or convey it in time to the appropriate points. Cases of abandoned and already spoiled output worth thousands of leva--losses for the national economy--are not rare. These losses which the national economy suffers are not caused by unforeseen circumstances and therefore justifiable, but by the lack of sound organization and concern for good management.

From the check made in the above-indicated Turgovishte Okrug by MVR agencies and people's control commissions it was established that "the fate of machines, scores of tons of products, chemical fertilizers, feeds, and thousands of head of livestock is at the mercy of fate."²

An uneconomic attitude towards the machinery park and raw materials, towards the gathering in and storage of the finished products of industry and agriculture is one of the gravest forms of squandering socialist property and national resources. Anybody can ascertain this around construction sites, industrial projects and farms. Tons of iron and other materials, for example, were abandoned in building the new ski lift for the "Aleko" mountain hostel.

Expensive machinery procured from abroad for thousands of foreign-exchange leva stands in the open for months without elementary care shown for its protection and safekeeping. This holds true not only for machinery procured for equipping industrial projects, but also for that for agriculture. Many farm implements stand in the open the year round, and some machines are even on blocks in the field.

What keeps, for example, the managers of our agriculture, if they have no money, from improvising shelters made of the materials at hand, covered with tiles or other materials? Nothing! This is a matter of high awareness and care, everyday care that must be taken for the safeguarding of public property.

The damage from mismanagement in 1975, as ascertained by the MVR Scientific Research Institute for Criminalistics and the Council for Criminological Research of the Office of the Chief Prosecutor of the Bulgarian People's Republic, amounted to 149 million leva.

Due to the failure to take sufficient care and due to criminal negligence, farm animals die, various products spoil and are destroyed.

The state agencies performing functions involving the protection of public property have legal powers to act more firmly and to impose more severe and fairer sentences for an uneconomic attitude on those who are supposed to see to the safeguarding of the people's property. Paragraph 1 of article 219 of the NK decrees, "An official who does not give sufficient care to the supervision, administration, management or safeguarding of property entrusted to him or to the job assigned him and in consequence thereof significant harm, destruction or squandering of property or other significant injury to an enterprise or to the national economy results, shall be punished by deprivation of liberty for up to 3 years or by correctional labor."

". . . There should be strict enforcement of the penal law," said Comrade T. Zhivkov in his speech to the July (1976) Plenum, "that envisages legal liability of up to 3 years' imprisonment for anyone who mismanages national property entrusted to him, permits losses to the national economy and squanders the people's money."³

On coming to power the bourgeoisie proclaimed the safeguarding of private property as something sacred and inviolable. Actually, if any property should be extolled as sacred and inviolable, it should only be socialist property which abolished the exploitation of man by man. Even more solid legal, economic and moral guarantees must be created to protect socialist property from thieves and plunderers. There must be an uncompromising struggle against encroachment upon and squandering of the people's labor, of the people's wealth.

All thieves and squanderers of socialist property must be exposed to public view--in the press, in the okrug, in the city, in the ward and in the village, to serve as an example and for public reproach. There is no name for encroachment upon socialist property other than theft. The euphemism of "misappropriation" must be abolished.

These antipublic and antisocial acts, committed by persons deliberately and with direct malice against the people's property and the people's goods for personal advantage and for mercenary interests, are a serious crime not only from the legal point of view according to the Criminal Code, but also from the standpoint of our socialist morality.

Here the question arises legitimately whether the sentences which are handed down are sufficiently effective and whether they help cut short these antisocial phenomena.

The foregoing facts substantiate the necessity of raising the requirements as regards the management and safeguarding of socialist property, as well as seeking greater liability on the part of those who encroach by stealing, plundering and wasting public property.

We believe that chapters 5 and 6 of the Criminal Code ("Crimes against Socialist Property" and "Crimes against the Socialist Economy") should be reexamined anew and given new meaning, and on the basis of the finds that we have it will be advisable to increase the sanctions for some violations like thefts, etc., of state, cooperative and other public property. Generally, the sanctions provided for in these chapters, and practical experience, show that they are not sufficiently effective to cut short thefts and mismanagement of public property. The sanctions provided are, to a great extent, light in view of the character of the acts, which have a high degree of public danger, and the injury that they cause. Moreover, not all sanctions are fully implemented. Therefore they cannot have a sufficiently deterrent and educational effect on the perpetrators and on those citizens who are prone to such acts. Recidivists, who are many, confirm this.

Qualified penalties under article 195, envisaged from section 1 through 6 inclusive such as theft of state, cooperative or other property during a fire, flood, shipwreck, fatal accident, war, etc., or chattels stolen which are not under constant surveillance such as farm produce, machines, cattle, etc., left in the field, as well as other cases qualified by this article, have proved ineffective.

Obviously in the case of these grave crimes, to be effective the sanction must be stricter and more severe, for public property has been violated under especially grave circumstances demanding that state property not be stolen, but that help be given in safeguarding it. Repression must be fair and severe in order to have a deterrent effect. In these crimes with a high degree of public danger there is no place for humanism. It is disastrous and nothing warrants it.

Here are some facts and examples from judicial practice. On the persons guilty of the death of 221 calves, 6 months of correctional labor was imposed with a 15-percent deduction from labor remuneration, and on the person in charge of the dairy farm only 4 months of correctional labor with a 15-percent deduction. The supreme court reversed the sentence and replaced it with deprivation of liberty. Another case: damage was done to the national economy in the amount of 81,707 leva; a penalty of 8 and 6 months deprivation of liberty was imposed on defendants with application of article 66 of the NK on conditional conviction. The supreme court reversed the conditional conviction. A penalty of only 8 months of correctional labor was imposed for the destroyed 20 tons of kashkaval [yellow cheese] with a 20-percent deduction from labor remuneration.

The sentences require no comment. They are trifling in comparison with so great injury done to the national economy. Such sentences could have no educational or deterrent effect. On the contrary, they will have the opposite result. A systematic and consistent campaign must be conducted for the creative conduct of a socialist penal policy. The sharp edge of penal repression must be turned against the perpetrators of grave crimes of marked public danger. An end must be put to underestimation on the part of some judicial and prosecutorial personnel of strictness and of fair and lawful punishment as a means of curbing criminal behavior.

Obviously, as far as mismanagement is concerned, article 219 has no special effect in cutting short these crimes. The sanctions for it must be increased. "However, ways of increasing the social effectiveness of article 219 of the NK must be sought."⁴

The fact that these antisocial and antipublic acts with a high degree of public danger exist naturally and logically raises the question: What are the reasons that give rise to them, and what are their sources? The reasons are complex, multiple and of a most diverse nature. Most generally speaking, they are of an objective and subjective character.

The existence of certain objective conditions to a great extent contributes to the appearance of these negative phenomena.

First, we must point out that the state itself has not created a solid and constantly operative control system. If there was a well established control mechanism of various echelons, at various levels, these antisocial phenomena would have been prevented or their development would have been nipped in the bud. To avert a crime while it is still being hatched, an excellently operating warning system must be established. This is one aspect of the question. The other is, what personnel should be employed in this system? Unquestionably, this control must be exercised by well chosen, inculcated and trained people with professional training, with proved public virtues, resistant to temptation and bribes.

There are serious shortcomings in the selection, training, inculcation and development of economic cadres entrusted with responsible accounting activities involving material and financial liability. Outside economic control, such as

financial audit, quality control, price control, tariff and foreign-exchange control, trade and services control, etc., are inadequate and irregular in scope.

Studies show that a number of deficiencies occur in the administration and activity of economic organizations which objectively foster crimes against socialist property. Nearly two-thirds of embezzlements are committed if there are significant shortcomings in the activity of control agencies and if the primary accounts are in an unsatisfactory state. In many cases control is perfunctory, superficial and ineffective. For 30.8 percent of the violations this control was of decisive significance. Requirements are breached in the compiling of the documents themselves. Very often full and periodic information is lacking from the bookkeeping services regarding the weaknesses that occur and the taking of urgent measures to eliminate these weaknesses. Timely bookkeeping entries are not always made for economic operations.

Many thefts are perpetrated during the transportation of commodities and physical assets. There is an inadequately organized, ineffective guard at construction projects, of agricultural products and in industrial production combines, workshops, etc., not only against encroachment, but also as regards spoilage and waste of the output that is produced. And not least, lapses in the work of operational investigative, prosecutorial and judicial agencies.

Once more we must cite the conclusion which the MVR agencies and the people's control commissions drew from the check in Turgovishte Okrug, made in the summer and autumn of 1983. "We came across shocking cases of poor primary accounts and current financial control. Nobody can say what and how much is loaded, transported and stored on farms. Scales are not in good working order, etc. Some of the performing cadres are untrained for work with goods and physical assets and the fluctuation and management thereof. The reaction of public opinion, of economic managements and of materially liable persons is unsatisfactory, and their relentlessness is inadequate, especially in respect of petty encroachments. 'Good-fellow trust' is the practice at a number of places in the acceptance and storage of large quantities of output."⁵

Other reasons, which are of a subjective character, have to do with the perpetrators themselves, their upbringing, standards, mentality, mental distortion and criminal inclinations towards thefts and pilfering, shortcomings in the personal molding of positive characters. Not a few cases are encountered where materially liable officials have been penalized repeatedly under article 219 of the NK for mismanagement and have been reappointed to such jobs.

Investigations show that 44.2 percent of the crimes committed against socialist property are due to low civic consciousness, to private-property strivings for the purpose of increasing income illegally, etc.

Some crimes are due to indolence and lack of work skills, getting the means of subsistence, leading a dissolute life, etc. Most often economic benefits are the basic impulse for these crimes. The fact that there was a low consciousness and sense of justice was the reason for 85.6 percent of the crimes involving an uneconomic attitude towards the socialist economy in 1978-1979.

The most effective way of combating this antisocial behavior, apart from strict and fair criminal liability, is the organization of widespread and constant preventive activity--control, constantly operative departmental control, party control, control of the labor forces, control of public organizations, control on the part of the whole of public opinion.

Output quality is another form of encroachment upon and waste of socialist property. The question of quality does not lie outside the sphere of wasteful practices. Bad and poor-quality output are also waste of material and labor.

Comrade Todor Zhivkov as early as his speech to the July Plenum noted in this regard: ". . . the time when first and foremost we had to produce more even though it made no particular claims to quality has passed. . . . There are still enterprises which produce low-quality output; in essence, this means that their labor forces /are wasting raw materials and supplies, other people's labor and their own, are getting pay and bonuses and doing economic harm to the citizens who are forced to buy their output, or else the state does when the output remains unsold in the warehouses"/ [in boldface] (in italics--V. Ts.).⁶

Poor quality of goods ties up large sums which not only yield no revenues, but cause considerable losses to the national economy. These goods, on the one hand, injure not only the citizens who for the lack of other higher-quality goods are obliged to buy them, but, on the other hand, they injure the state. A requirement must be set for trading organizations not to purchase goods that do not meet trade standards, while losses for goods remaining unsold must be borne by the enterprise and production forces.

The losses to the national economy from substandard output are large. In 1982 the Chief Inspectorate of the Ministry of Internal Trade and Public Services stopped--and in only partial checks at that--substandard goods worth more than 66 million leva. The sum total of losses declared by the ministry in 1982 alone amounted to more than 10 million leva. These losses were 68 percent greater than in 1981.⁷

A strict control barrier must be raised in front of all goods and losses from poor quality must be at the expense of the culpable persons.

Due to the poor quality of output, it is imperative that penal sanctions be introduced for those who produce poor-quality goods. "High quality depends on the high awareness of us all. If there is none, there must be legal sanctions," the workers propose. "Whoever produces poor output and certifies it, whoever sells it should pay for it. And poor services should be at the expense of whoever renders them."⁸

The question of high quality of output and mismanagement was discussed and is incorporated in sections 10 and 11 of the Decision of the Joint Session of the BCP Central Committee, the Council of Ministers and the governing bodies of the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union], the BPS [Bulgarian Trade Unions], the OF [Fatherland Front] and the DKMS [Dimitrov Communist Youth Union] on further implementation of the December program. It points out that

/"the campaign for high quality/ [in boldface] (in italics--V. Ts.) must involve the economical utilization of raw materials, supplies, fuels and energy and the most efficient use of live and embodied labor. The production of /poor-quality output and services must be regarded as an antisocial deed . . . , war must be waged against any manifestation of laxity and irresponsibility, of disorganization and mismanagement"/ [in boldface] (in italics--V. Ts.).⁹

Poor-quality output and services are characterized as an antisocial deed. A reprehensible characterization and punishable under the Criminal Code. The production of poor-quality output should be characterized as an encroachment upon socialist property.

The question of quality is now one of the fundamental questions of our economy. The National Party Conference (1984), devoted to problems of output quality, substantiated the tremendous significance that the BCP attaches to this question.

The campaign against thefts, mismanagement, wasteful practices and low-quality output is closely linked with the campaign for economies. What is required now is the most practical and efficient use of all resources involved in the production process and the public services in all spheres.

Obviously, these antisocial phenomena in our life such as the theft and waste of socialist property, which do great injury to the national economy require still bolder application of fair and severe punishment. Those state agencies which perform the function of safeguarding socialist property must urgently start performing it firmly and uncompromisingly, for this is their right, but at the same time also their great duty to our people. As Comrade T. Zhivkov emphasized in his speech to the 12th Party Congress, judicial and prosecutorial agencies must be guaranteed that their activity is exempt from any signs of intervention in their work on the part of the executive authority.¹⁰ This thought of Comrade T. Zhivkov's applies not only to administrative bodies, but also to public and political agencies and organizations. All the ways in which the people's property is encroached upon and wasted and the people's labor looted must be exposed. Obviously, for this campaign to be successful and to block the path of anybody who encroaches upon socialist property and the socialist economy, the sanctions imposed for crimes which are of high economic and public danger must be increased. This necessitates the reexamination of chapters 5 and 6 of the Criminal Code, which have to do with the safeguarding of socialist property and the socialist economy.

Apart from these measures, other possibilities and means, forms and incentives must be sought which will help put an end to this antisocial behavior.

One of the possibilities is to create conditions and forms of personal concern. Material and moral encouragements and incentives must be given to the good, conscientious and disciplined workers, as well as to those entrusted with the preservation of socialist property or working with it and seeing to its safeguarding and augmentation with a sense of good stewards. Those toilers who take special pains and make special efforts every day in animal husbandry--a very important, onerous and crucial sector and area of agriculture--must also be given incentives.

Personal interest is of great importance at present in our country and it concerns not only the production sphere, but also other areas.

The campaign for the safeguarding of socialist property must become a nationwide campaign and must enlist our entire public opinion. All public organizations must play a large role in this campaign. From their earliest age the younger generation must be inculcated, not only in the family, but also in school and in Pioneer and Komsomol organizations, to take greater care of socialist property than their own, and to guard and augment it, for on it depend not only the prosperity and fortune of the individual citizen, but also the prosperity of all the people. It is the national wealth, it is the labor and sweat of the people. The safeguarding of public property must be for the younger generation and for all citizens one of the most important features of communist morality.

Socialist property and its various forms belong to the people; it is a guarantee of their happy present and future and they have an inalienable right and duty to exercise constant nationwide control over its safeguarding, management and augmentation. "Indeed, a nationwide control is needed which will ensure the fulfillment of assigned tasks and create an atmosphere of implacability towards violations of discipline, towards encroachments on socialist property and the rights of citizens, towards any attempt whatsoever to circumvent or disregard socialist law."¹¹

The three most important components of communist morality are one's attitude towards national property, towards labor and towards the socialist rule of law. To inculcate them into the consciousness of our country's citizens so that they will be uncompromising fighters in the defense of public property and the socialist rule of law, a campaign must constantly be conducted by the party, by the state and by the whole of public opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1. T. Zhivkov, "Izbr. Such." [Selected Works], Vol 25, p 166.
2. The newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO [Workers' Cause], No 290 of 17 October 1983.
3. T. Zhivkov, "Izbr. Such.," Vol 25, p 166.
4. Iv. Palazov, "Problemi na Prestupnata Bezstopanstvenost v Praktika na Vurkhovniya Sud na NRB [Problems of Criminal Mismanagement in the Practice of the Supreme Court of the Bulgarian People's Republic], Sofia, 1979, p 5.
5. The newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO, No 290 of 17 October 1984.
6. T. Zhivkov, "Isbr. Such.," Vol 25, p 141.
7. The newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO, No 151 of 31 May 1983.

8. The newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO, No 80 of 21 March 1983.
9. "Za Po-Natatushното Izpulnenie na Dekemvriyskata Programa za Povishavane Zhiznenoto Ravnishte na Naroda v Suotvetstvie s Resheniyata na XII Kongres na BKP" [On Further Implementation of the December Program for Raising the Living Standard of the People in Conformity with the Decisions of the 12th BCP Congress], Partizdat, 1983, pp 13-14.
10. See T. Zhivkov, "Otchet na Tsentralniya Komitet na Bulgarskata Komunisticheska Partiya pred Dvanadesetiya Kongres i Predstoyashtite Zadachi na Partiya" [Report of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party to the 12th Congress and Impending Tasks of the Party], Sofia, 1981, p 103.
11. Ibid., pp 100-101.

6474

CSO: 2200/172

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

DIFFICULTIES IN EMPLOYMENT OF GRADUATES REVEALED

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 10 Aug 84 p 1

[Excerpts] Our educational system, the wide network of universities, professional schools and high schools rightfully commands the respect of experts from many larger countries. The quality of instruction and its results have gained international recognition. These are undoubtedly assets which must be further developed and strengthened.

However, the creation of possibilities, circumstances and conditions [leading] to a high degree of education is only one side of the coin. The other side is the correlation of the achieved degree of knowledge with the opportunity to use it in practice, especially in view of the tasks of the national economy. As is well known, the demands on the intensity of the performance of the national economy keep rising. The most reliable way to improve its performance is the broadest possible application of the scientific and technological know-how in practice. To that end, two conditions must be met--to have such know-how at one's disposal and to know how to apply it. And precisely the second condition depends very much on the level at which people with the necessary education can demonstrate their abilities in corresponding positions.

In accordance with the needs of intensive development of our economy, the number of university-educated workers and high-school graduates reached 28 percent of the total number of workers toward the end of the 1970's. Of the positions whose prerequisites include qualifications acquired by university education, approximately 90 percent are filled by experts, others by workers with a completed vocational high-school or other education. On the other hand, more than 15 percent of positions with a prescribed completed vocational high-school education are filled by university graduates. This shows that there exist some undesirable phenomena in full utilization of [a worker's] qualifications.

In the last few years there were certain problems with placing graduates, and thus some of them occupy positions that are not in line with their vocational preparation.

The best way how to correct this situation is by filling positions with workers who have the prescribed level of qualification, and by eliminating

unconditionally any past deficiencies in checking the applicant's background according to the above-mentioned guidelines. There is also a considerable number of positions filled by workers without the necessary qualifications, often by workers who have already reached retirement age. It would be a gross oversimplification [to want] to solve the problem by simply replacing such workers of retirement age by others with the necessary qualifications. The only proper criterion for judgment--not only about workers of retirement age but about others as well--can be whether they are fulfilling the tasks entrusted to them successfully, in accordance with the needs of the national economy. Thus, when such changes are being considered, the decision must be based not on age or on a diploma but on the ability to fulfill the entrusted tasks properly.

The problems with placing graduates have become more serious especially since the beginning of the 1980's, when their number considerably exceeded the needs of government ministries and of national committees, and the discrepancy between the public needs and the graduates' areas of specialization also widened. The causes of the above-mentioned deficiencies are, for the most part, subjective in character and are rooted in serious failures in planning and supervision within a given region, in neglecting to abide by state discipline, by principles of screening and checking personal data, in hitherto unsatisfactory application of scientific and technological developments. The problems also stem from the fact that some of the graduates look for a job without considering the needs of the society and increase pressure on job opportunities in large population centers, while in other regions (for instance, in the North Bohemian region) the need for qualified workers is not met.

The placing of graduates is a politically sensitive matter. The right to education is without doubt one of the advantages of our system. However, there are two sides to it. The above mentioned right brings with it, at the very least, the moral obligation to repay the state for its care by doing responsible work in a sector where the national economy and the society need it. For instance, the education of a university graduate costs the state on the average a half million korunas. This fact repudiates the stubborn conviction of some graduates that they must be given employment in a place of their own choosing and can turn down jobs elsewhere, even though these frequently offer considerable monetary advantages.

The government of the CSSR recently evaluated the previous method of placing university or high school graduates and addressed [the issue of] its improvement and development and of the utilization of high-school and university education in the national economy. It passed a number of measures aimed at improvements in the mode of planning for and placing of graduates. It charged [the appropriate authorities] to arrange the method of identifying the needs for qualified workers and their placement in a manner that would respect the interests and needs of society and assure the optimal utilization of the workers' qualifications. In estimating the need for qualified workers for the Eighth 5-Year Plan, the number of young people accepted for study at high schools and universities will be verified [and] compared with the needs of the national economy, and the best solution will be suggested.

In connection with this, it is necessary to consider increasing the quota of young people in training for challenging manual occupations in tracks leading to a high-school diploma to 12.5 percent of the total number of youth, primarily in order to secure the financial, numerical and political future of vocational high schools.

Further measures pertain to improvement in vocational counseling services for youth in primary schools in order to ensure greater harmony between the methods of placement of youth and the needs of the national economy. [Other measures pertain] to improvement in the process of placing graduates of vocational high schools, secondary schools and universities, and to provisions for these schools' participation in the implementation of the process through closer contact with organizations which their graduates are to enter. In accordance with the principles of the second stage of the program of higher economic effectiveness of the wage system, the government decided to permit exceptions from the prescribed education only in special cases, that is, only for experts with experience, male workers over 50, female workers over 45 years of age.

12435

CSO: 2400/416

NUMBER OF PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS SEEN INCREASING

West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL in German 22 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Michael Mara: "GDR Army With More Professional Soldiers; Step Toward Increasing Combat Strength and Combat Readiness"]

[Text] "The military profession is a constant challenge to the personality. It is beautiful, eventful, and glorious." It "not only demands much, but also gives much." A young man "matures quickly to manhood." With such catchy slogans (the one quoted is taken from the advisor "I Become a Soldier" in the East-Berlin State Publishing Enterprise), and with political-ideological arguments, the GDR advertises more intensely than ever for new blood in the military profession. To make the decision easier for youths, the soldier's profession is represented as the "profession with a future," which "lies at the very depth of social interest."

The East Berlin party and military leadership regards the increased complement of the GDR fighting forces with professional soldiers as an absolute necessity precisely at this point in time. On the one hand, recruitment gaps are to be compensated thereby, gaps which arise from the fact that low-birth years are now coming into draft age. On the other hand, a larger proportion of professional soldiers in the combat forces is regarded as an essential condition for increased fighting force and combat readiness. The party leadership therefore has recently repeatedly stressed the significance of "securing new blood for the military profession" and has presented this as "an overall social task." The foundation stone for "securing the new blood" is already laid in kindergarten and in the children's organization "Young Pioneers" as well as in the first years of school, where the children learn that the soldier's profession is something to be ambitioned. The actual solicitation begins in the seventh grade. "Officials for securing new trainees" then appear before the pupils. Such officials now exist in all GDR schools. There are excursions to units of the combat forces and personal conversations with appropriate students. The obligatory combat training and the premilitary education also fulfill important tasks in garnering new trainees.

Already in the ninth grade, and in particular by 31 March as a deadline, the students should apply in writing for a military profession. For this they are handed a uniform form sheet. Solicitation is possible later, too, however, but at the most by age 23. After the application has been "confirmed" by the leaders of the regional defense command, professional training, lasting several years, begins.

For this purpose, the future professional soldiers are collected together into so-called FDJ (Free German Youth) applicant collectives and are there taken care of until they are called. The activity of these collectives concentrates on effective ideological and military-political training as well as on the "formation of soldier characteristics." Another task consists in imparting "realistic ideas" concerning everyday military life by visits to troop units, conversations with professional soldiers, etc. Furthermore, they assume responsible tasks in premilitary training.

Recently, the "FDJ applicant collectives" are supposed to strive even more to "stabilize" the decision for the military profession. Precisely in recent years, a large number of youths has again withdrawn submitted applications. Partly because of the appearance of doubts about the correctness of their decision and altogether about the meaning of being a soldier, frequently also because of the influence of girlfriends or fiancées. The premilitary Society for Sport and Engineering (GST) therefore will concern itself more about the girlfriends and brides of the incipient professional soldiers and their armaments consciousness.

To keep the "fluctuation" lower, the party military leadership has recently been pressing hard to pay even more attention than previously to the principle of political reliability when soliciting new trainees. A "preselection" should already take place in the seventh and eighth grade, strictly according to this perspective. The final selection in the ninth grade should also be made in these terms, as well as the further professional preparation. As the army leadership emphasizes, the cadre membership is to be profiled not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, so as to be superior to the opponent in case of war.

8348

CSO: 2300/604

GROUND FORCES COMMANDER URGES TIGHTER DISCIPLINE

East Berlin DEUTSCHE LEHRERZEITUNG in German Vol 31, 15 Jun 84 p 8

[Article by Col Gen Horst Stechbarth, member, SED Central Committee, Deputy Minister for National Defense and Chief of the Ground Forces: "With Heart and Mind to be a Soldier of Peace; the Present and the Future Demands on NVA Members"]

[Text] The imperialist confrontation and arms buildup course calls for more fighting strength and combat readiness in the NVA. That implies constantly increasing political-moral, intellectual, psychological, physical and also character demands placed on each and every army member. They are coped with in the troop components and units, mainly, when the commanders can rely in their political and military training and education on the leads achieved in military education work with the growing generation.

Our entire socialist society has always made an inestimable contribution to that. It must continue to be made in the future.

Political Maturity and a Class-bound Stance

What marks the present and future demands on NVA members?

First, military service makes a high demand on the soldiers' political maturity and class-bound stance. Great dedication to fulfilling the political and military tasks, political-moral steadfastness, courage, selflessness and the readiness for sacrifice mainly grow out of the knowledge of how much there is to defend. Only someone who is deeply convinced of the justice and victoriousness of our struggle and has understood the meaning of being a soldier under socialism will be able to stand up as a steadfast defender of socialism. The socialist soldier's defense motivation rests on a deep love for the homeland and on the firm conviction that only in socialism can the vital interests of the working people be realized. It is consolidated by our unshakable confidence in SED policy and our state's government. It receives impulses from the firm friendship with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist states.

Contempt for and repugnance to the inhuman imperialist system form the will to contribute, through exemplary achievements in political and military training, and through an undeterred and steadfast fulfilment of the class mission, to

thwarting the imperialist confrontation course. The more deeply this basic political-moral position and the class-bound modes of thought and conduct resulting from it are already formed at the start of the military service, the better we will succeed in fast preparing the young soldiers for their coping with the many tasks in the military collectives.

Applicable Knowledge and Skill, Moral-Combative Characteristics

At the same time, scientific-technical progress and the all-round further development of military affairs that goes with it are making new demands on the moral-combative characteristics and the knowledge and skill of the army members. From the first day of their military service, the young soldiers are trained in modern, effective and complicated arms, combat techniques and equipment. Wherever they may be assigned, as motorized infantrymen or gunners, tank soldiers or radio operators, or in the missile units or in antiaircraft, everywhere they are dealing with modern weapons systems and combat equipment. The latest science and technology data have gone into them. In the ground forces that is reflected by the consistent motorization of the troops and the ongoing mechanization and automation of weapons employment and troop command. That is expressed by such efficient and effective weapons and combat equipment as the amphibious armored combat vehicle, the modern medium-size tanks of the Soviet T series, antitank guided missiles, air defense weapons, self-propelled artillery and many others.

These modern arms and the combat equipment have outstanding combat properties and performance parameters. Their effective use, however, is exclusively dependent on the people who use, operate, service and maintain them. High demands are made on their knowledge and skill, their discipline and sense of responsibility. Every soldier must be a master in his field on his spot and fully control all his activities even under extreme stress. That calls for an excellent state of training that depends on tense mental work and intellectual abilities as much as on intensive training in the various courses of operations.

From the fact, however, that on behalf of permanent combat readiness such modern military equipment has to be mastered in a relatively short time and that in spite of more complicated equipment there is no extra time available for training, high demands arise for the effectiveness of military training and for the readiness and ability of the young soldiers to acquire comprehensive and detailed knowledge about the weapons and combat equipment and learn to cope with them with certainty. Solid preparatory natural science and technical knowledge is an important prerequisite for it.

The ongoing replacement of single weapons by weapons systems and group weapons brings it about that rapid and accurately correlated operations by military collectives are becoming increasingly imperative for operating successfully. Any given soldier's share in solving responsible tasks is growing as far as the overall effect is concerned. That makes cohesive operations by military collectives still more important. It makes higher demands on the soldiers' cooperating in squads, service teams and crews and on their being reciprocally replaceable. It also calls for high military discipline.

Discipline, Order and Accuracy

At all times and under all conditions a commander must be able to rely on that an individual will steadily and reliably do his job even when he can no longer be directly led and supervised by his superior, in his tight combat station or under time pressure. That calls for instilling accuracy and precision in the army members, because even the slightest deviations from assigned parameters may prevent or render ineffective the use of modern weapons systems. If a radar operator catches an enemy aircraft only a few seconds too late, a rocket for its destruction can no longer be launched. If a relay gunner misses the sighting on his graduated scale by only one point, the grenade will miss its target. Discipline, order and accuracy therefore, under the requirements of scientific-technical progress in military affairs, become more than ever direct prerequisites for high fighting strength and combat readiness. Only someone who has learned early in the game, in public life in our country, in the thousand little things of everyday living, to work and live in a disciplined manner will be able to cope.

More effective and intricate military equipment and the broadening operational and combat possibilities it provides for the troops not only increases the proportion of mental work in military activity, but also the physical and psychological stress imposed on the army members. So it will often become necessary for the soldiers to work without pause, incessantly, taxing their physical and mental capacities to the utmost, often in enclosed spaces and tight cabins, under limited visibility, with little freedom to move, and in unusual and uncomfortable crouch postures.

Physical Strength, Dexterity, Persistence and Speed

Nor have physical strength, dexterity, persistence and speed lost their importance because of the scientific-technical progress in military affairs; on the contrary, more still is demanded of that than in the past. Even if today long distances are normally no longer taken on foot, a motorized infantryman still must be able, dismounted from his armored vehicle, to lead an assault, jump over obstacles or creep through them, and still hit his mark when he fires. Also a driver of a most modern tank, driving for 14 to 16 hours several hundred kilometers, must tank his vehicle and service it during breaks and possibly remove some technical faults. And artillery gunners have to put a gun that weighs tons into fire position within seconds and start it up for firing.

Such high physical and psychological demands arise in all arms and services and special troops. Those soldiers who from their early childhood have acquired high physical and mental capabilities will cope best with it.

If we are to summarize the demands made on the soldiers of the 1980's, then the crucial prerequisites are love for the homeland, political steadfastness, a pronounced sense of responsibility and reliability, military skill and a physical-psychological capacity, so as to reliably being able to fulfil at all times the complicated tasks in combat training, in exercises and maneuvers, on guard and on alert.

Training young people early, putting them in the position where they can exert themselves, with heart and mind, for the protection of the working people's socialist accomplishments and for safeguarding world peace, threatened as it is by the most aggressive imperialist forces, that is a great and beautiful task in which I wish all associates in the schools and public education institutions the fullest success.

Bio Data on Col Gen Horst Stechbarth:

He is 58 years of age, married and father of three children. Started his work as a rural worker, joined the armed forces in March 1949. A graduate military scientist and graduate of the Military General Staff Academy of the USSR armed forces. SED member since 1951. The delegates of the ninth party congress elected him a SED Central Committee candidate. Since 1978 SED Central Committee member. Distinctions: the Patriotic Medal of Merit in gold, the Scharnhorst Medal, the USSR Order of the Peoples' Friendship. He is a "meritorious member of the NVA."

5885

CSO: 2300/622

FRG BROADCASTING PRACTICES SHARPLY CONDEMNED

Deutschlandfunk Charged with Subversion

East Berlin IPW BERICHTe in German No 7 Jul 84 pp 49-51

[Article by M. Klaus]

[Text] Deutschlandfunk (DLF), on the air since 1 January 1962--as much as Deutsche Welle (DW)¹--both operated in the Cologne broadcast house, is an FRG radio station which, on the basis of the FRG Bundestag law on setting up radio stations under federal law, as of 20 November 1960,² primarily deals with tasks in the government's foreign propaganda. The longwave and mediumwave station concentrates exclusively on the European region.

DLF's main target is the GDR. Its German language program around the clock aims at a continuing interference with the GDR's domestic affairs and an imperialist "German reunification." Antisocialist diversionary programs are produced by DLF furthermore in Polish, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian and come both from the DLF and the DW transmitters. The DW programs in Serbo-Croatian and Romanian are doing something similar. Then there also are DLF foreign propaganda programs daily for 14 hours for Western Europe in English, French, Dutch, Italian, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish.

The DLF has more than 700 full-time employees.³ Furthermore, journalists of other FRG media are involved in the station's activity; they are accentuating nationalistic and revanchist goals. For reporting from states in which it does not have correspondents of its own DLF uses the foreign bureaus network of the Working Association of the Statutory Broadcasting Corporations of the Federal Republic of Germany (ARD), of which it is a member.

DLF keeps close contact with institutions doing research on the GDR and on communism, especially the "Ostforschungs" institutes at Cologne University, the FRG federal Institute for Eastern and International Scientific Studies, and the German Institute for Economic Research in West Berlin. Their associates, often heard on the station, are meant to provide a scholarly coating for the antisocialist propaganda lines.

In 1983, the station got DM 90.7 million from the federal budget. In addition, from ARD's radio dues revenue, it got DM 41.7 million.⁴ In 1973, that share was only DM 28 million,⁵ but it is intended to be raised to DM 52 million.⁶

DFL programs come over two long-wave and seven medium-wave transmitters.⁷ In the Bonn-Cologne region, "where diplomats and ministers are potential listeners,"⁸ DLF can also be received since 1975 via ultrashort wave.

The station is making great efforts to improve its technical base. The largest spectral grid antenna in Europe was installed near Mainflingen in 1966; from there they mainly transmit the foreign language programs to Eastern Europe. There are plans for 16 ultrashort wave transmitters along the FRG border, "not last, to reach listeners in the GDR."⁹

Now the DLF is entering the new media. Since the beginning of the year it has fed its topical program into the Ludwigshafen cable pilot project.¹⁰ The station also wants to take part in satellite broadcasting.

Firmly in the Grip of Conservative Forces

Declared, in formal legal terms, an "independent institution of public law for the common good,"¹¹ the influence of the FRG government on the station is shored up by a "competency right" that is exercised by the FRG Ministry of the Interior. The ministry regards the DLF as being under its jurisdiction.¹² The FRG government finds another chance for direct influence in its statutory control over the station, which includes the right to issue instructions.¹³

The FRG foreign ministry has appointed a "coordinator and advisor," who is to brief in daily DLF and DW conferences "on the Foreign Office ideas about any Ostpolitik issues that may come up" and prevent "contradictory views and interpretations from being broadcast."¹⁴

Since the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition took over in Bonn in the fall of 1982 mainly conservative forces have sought to turn DLF still more unabashedly into a government station. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU commented: "Is DLF becoming a 'black channel' and are the switches being set in this country-wide station for a 'spiritual-moral turn' of the Kohl-Genscher type? There is much to support the apprehension that after the government change in Bonn the CDU media policy now is intent on finally getting its grip on the radio stations."¹⁵

Thanks to its two-third majority in the DLF broadcast council--17 of its 22 members are appointed or chosen by the government, the Bundesrat and the Bundestag--the coalition parties in June 1983 managed to put a man of their confidence on top of it: W. Mischnick, chairman of the FDP faction in the FRG Bundestag, has headed this organ since, which determines the programming and personnel policy in the station.

Conservative pressure also is brought to bear on DLF Manager R. Becker (SPD), whose incumbency runs till 1988. In October 1982 already, the majority of the broadcast council blamed him for a "one-sided and highly overdrawn" programming "before and during the forming of the new government,"¹⁶ and in 1983 there were more attempts made to push him out.

Influencing the journalistic work at DLF by conservative forces is being pushed particularly by the programming guidelines the broadcast council passed on 29 September 1983. According to them, "the broadcast council can give guidelines to the manager and supervise their being observed" now.¹⁷ The FRG press is making

the point that this is "unprecedented in FRG broadcasting history and comes down to curtailing the freedom to broadcast."¹⁸ The FRG Journalists Association (DJV) has turned against such stipulations because they made "the journalists puppets of the board of the broadcasting directors and its political decisions, manipulated by the manager."¹⁹

By electing the spokesman of the "East Prussian Local Affiliation," O. Hennig, state secretary in the Ministry for Inner-German Relations, into the DLF broadcast council in 1983, the revanchist organizations also have further boosted their influence on this station.

Anticommunism as the "Basic Tune"

In 1967 an FRG journal acknowledged to the DLF that "a sturdy anticommunism furnishes the basic tune for most talk programs."²⁰ A UNESCO opinion likewise described the DLF programs as "anticommunist, clearly negative toward the socialist states."²¹

It is an image the station has always openly espoused. In 1975, when detente and cooperation were agreed on in Helsinki, it announced: "You can thumb through the Helsinki Final Act from front to back and do not find a single word about that the information to be exchanged should have to be free from anti-communism. Apart from that, the question should be asked why anticommunism actually is supposed to be so bad."²²

DLF keeps spreading different variants of the lie about the Soviet threat. On 22 November 1983, the day when the FRG Bundestag ratified the NATO missile resolution, the station contended, e.g., irrespective of the actual military-strategic situation: "The reality right now is, in any event, that we are now being threatened by more than thousand warheads on Soviet SS 20 missiles, without the West having commensurate weapons available." On 22 September 1982 it warned against an alleged militarization of space by the Soviet Union: "Unless the West watches out, Moscow can upset the military equilibrium right from space."

Just as tenaciously DLF is trying to distort the socialist countries' measures to ensure their defense and secure the military-strategic equilibrium into "expansionist designs." On 3 September 1983, e.g., it called the Soviet air force's preventing the flight of a South Korean spy plane a "barbaric act of violence in peacetime." To the GDR the station, on 23 September 1983, attributed a "guns instead of butter policy." The forcible social welfare cuts in its own country, which evidence attributes to the constantly growing arms expenditures, is something DLF did not mention in its inflammatory broadcast.

On the one side, expansionism is constantly being imputed to socialism. On the other side, the United States and NATO are acknowledged for their peace-securing nature. Despite all the clear statements from the Reagan administration of contemplating conducting a "limited" nuclear war, DLF on 3 December 1983 defended the U.S. President against "mounting suspicions" he wanted to "conduct international conflicts by means of the new missiles on Europe's back."

These anticommunist calumnies and the eulogies on its own system and the aggressive NATO policy pursue a definite design, of course. They are meant to sow doubt in the socialist states' policy and pave the way in those countries--particularly in the GDR--for successful subversive activity by its own station and other institutions charged with it. As far as the GDR citizens are concerned, those responsible at DLF combine that with the goal of injecting in them an interest in the reunification of the two German states under an imperialist signature. The history and conceptions of the station are eloquent testimony to that.

Installed as an Instrument for Imperialist "Reunification" Policy

Right after the founding of the FRG, revanchist forces in Bonn developed plans to set up a reunification broadcasting station. One of the exponents of that project was the then FRG Minister for All-German Affairs, Jakob Kaiser (CDU) who wanted to prepare the GDR's joining the FRG by a "megaphone toward the East"²³ with extensive anticommunist propaganda. To that end, on 8 May 1953--six weeks prior to the attempt of a counterrevolutionary putsch against the GDR--a test program was started via a far-reaching long-wave frequency.

Because FRG imperialism, in connection with the counterrevolutionary events in Hungary, indulged in illusions about the political situation in the GDR, the provisional program of the DLF predecessor, the German Long-wave Station, was almost doubled in 1956 and supplemented by an hourly news service. Starting in 1958, the program was expanded once again.

When by the measures of 13 August 1961, to secure the GDR national border, the imperialist plans of aggression were foiled, the rulers in the FRG placed their hopes on reaching their old goals by means of more of an ideological subversion of socialism. To that end they installed the DLF in the second half of 1961, which has been transmitting since 1 January 1962. In a provocative "Greeting to the Middle Germans," the then FRG President gave shape to the revanchist broadcasting mission of placing GDR citizens in opposition to their state and orienting them to imperialist thought and conduct models: "DLF is to do what it can to that end in involving them in the life and work of the free part of the German people."²⁴

This mission is in effect unchanged although the FRG government has meanwhile signed documents binding under international law, such as the FRG-GDR Treaty on the Basis of Relations and the CSCE Final Act, which explicitly set down the obligation of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. Irrespective of that, FRG Bundestag President R. Stuecklen in 1982, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of starting its programs, cabled the DLF saying it was the most important task to reinforce the people in the GDR "in the hope also to live in freedom some day."²⁵ The haute bourgeois FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE explained at the same moment that in accordance with the DLF program mission "the [GDR] is understood to be a part of Germany (today still, even if with up to [unclear]ifications)."²⁶

ifications," optical revisions owed to the detente process of the 1970s. [unclear] deleted when the DLF broadcast council ratified its new program guidelines in September 1983. The guidelines for the first time commit the

entire DLF program to the "value system of the Basic Law"²⁷ of the FRG, that proceeds from the fictitious assumption of a Germany in its 1973 boundaries. From this illegal design DLF derives its GDR "mission": "The special mission of DLF mainly requires meeting the needs for information by radio subscribers, especially those in the GDR. Transmissions are to help nurture the Germans' mutual understanding and strengthen the awareness of their belonging together."²⁸

Subversion against the GDR

Constantly spreading the theses of a "continued existence of the German nation" and of "keeping the German question open" is a regular component of the subversive concept against the GDR; to help in its implementation is something DLF has written on its banners. It is the declared intention of the station to achieve "ideological impact" in socialist countries.²⁹ Its being tied into the ideological warfare concept of the NATO states confirms the Springer press which has written that DLF as much as DW was "the foreign service of BBC London and of the two American stations in Munich, Liberty and Free Europe, of central importance to the future of the free world. Those stations are beaming their programs toward the East."³⁰

About the current subversive methods the station announced on 27 September 1983: "'Change through Influence' is the program that promotes the human right to free development." With regard to the GDR population, DLF pursues mainly the following tactical lines:

--Like the U.S. diversionary stations Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and RIAS, it poses as the substitute domestic station (the GDR's "home station," in the DLF vernacular)³¹ offering its listeners a "current 'newspaper' several times every day"³² and "something like life support."³³ To that end, e.g., GDR press quotes, forged or out of context, are twisted into a cliché of an anticommunist GDR image every morning in the program entitled "From East Berlin Newspapers." Even back in 1974, the program format was adapted to the GDR living habits. Transmissions in this connection were supposed to be more "topical, flexible and substantial" and finding the station on the receiver was to be facilitated thereby.³⁴

--Still more than in the past the station is oriented to target groups it intends to provide with antisocialist argumentation models. While the early and daytime programs, with their tabloid features, mainly address broad strata, the background information in the evening ("Germany and the World," "Topics of the Day," and "Themes of Our Time") is chiefly meant for taping.

--The attempt is being made to sow mistrust about SED policy in some GDR population strata and encourage treasonable activities. On 15 May 1983, e.g., unequivocally with an antisocialist emphasis, the members of the parties in the Democratic Bloc were encouraged to put "the SED a bit under pressure and show their mettle." On 7 April 1983 the attempt was made to incite the GDR scientists to stand up against the party's defense policy. On 12 June 1983, e.g., the attempt was made to provoke church circles to aim their peace activities against the socialist state.

--Through considerable propaganda efforts citizens in the FRG and West Berlin are encouraged to take trips to "the other Germany" so as to underscore the "cohesiveness among the Germans," as it was put on 2 September 1983. DLF suggestions for talks with GDR citizens reveal the subversive objective that goes together with the imperialist "contact policy." In particular, according

to DLF, the demand for a so-called free movement in the GDR is supposed to "sharpen and stimulate the public awareness and political atmosphere."

Responsible for launching these subversive objectives against the GDR--incompatible with the legal status of a foreign radio station--are in particular the East-West editorial staff that belongs to the main, "topical program," department and the DLF studio in West Berlin.

The East-West editorial staff has the job to engage in "intensive observation of the political and social conditions in the GDR, work up background information, comment on certain facts and relate them to the broader context."³⁵ The West Berlin DLF studio mainly has to "skim off" information from GDR mass media to be used mainly for diversion and intelligence activities.

Splitter Tactics against the Community of Socialist States

Starting in 1963, DLF gradually went into special diversionary transmission in the languages of socialist countries in Eastern Europe. A demarkation of these programs as between DLF and DW went into effect on 1 January 1977; programs beamed at Poland, the CSSR and Hungary have been produced since only by DLF. The station has admitted that on the editorial staff assigned to that not a few are employed who have betrayed their countries.³⁶

In these language programs also every chance is used to defame by anticommunist attacks the socialist society as "bristling with weapons," "crisislike" and as "police states." Through constant attacks against an allegedly binding "socialism model of the Soviet Union" and through nationalistic slogans, the fraternal relations among the socialist nations are meant to be disturbed, anti-Sovietism is to be kindled, and the socialist society is to be split.

The station's history documents this: Wherever the counterrevolution has raised its head, DLF microphones were in place and DLF commentators sought to trigger parallel developments in the GDR. In the spring of 1968, e.g., DLF offered the intellectual ringleaders of the counterrevolution in the CSSR the chance to proclaim their antisocialist concept over the station. Among the demands raised were the elimination of socialist state power, breaking relations with the socialist community, an orientation toward the FRG, and an unobstructed distribution of counterrevolutionary pamphlets.³⁷ At the same time the Western side disseminated this: "The GDR must join the party. FRG government policy thus has to be guided by the desire to encourage the kind of development in the GDR that did get started in the CSSR."³⁸

DLF associates also take part in organizing or steering counterrevolutionary activities in place. In 1973, e.g., a DLF correspondent lost his accreditation in the CSSR because he took part personally, and in clear violation of international law, in the drafting of treasonable writings.³⁹ A "Special Polish Service"--installed at DLF as soon as martial law was declared in Poland on 13 December 1981--via a "Greeting Bridge" set up solely for that country, would broadcast counterrevolutionary news and instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. M. Klaus, "The FRG's Foreign Station Deutsche Welle," IPW-BERICHTe, No 10, 1983, pp 59 ff.
2. "Bundesgesetzblatt" [legal gazette] Part I, Bonn, 1960, pp 863 ff.
3. TV-COURIER, Weisbaden, 16 November 1981.
4. BUNDESANZEIGER, Cologne, 4 January 1983.
5. DIE WELT, Bonn, 15 February 1973.
6. SPD-PRESSEDIENST, Bonn, 10 June 1983.
7. "Internationales Handbuch fuer Rundfunk und Fernsehen" [International Radio and Television Handbook], 1982/93, Hamburg, 1982, p H60.
8. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, Frankfurt/Main, 26 September 1974.
9. Ibid., 25 October 1980.
10. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, Frankfurt/Main, 1 February 1984.
11. "Bundesgesetzblatt," Part I, loc. cit.
12. PRESSEDIENST DES BUNDESMINISTERIUMS DES INNERN, Bonn, 24 May 1977.
13. "Bundesgesetzblatt," Part I, loc. cit.
14. DER TAGESSPIEGEL, West Berlin, 13 June 1983.
15. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 11 June 1983.
16. VORWAERTS, Bonn, 28 July 1983.
17. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 16 September 1983.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 4 October 1983.
20. SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Munich, 8 February 1967.
21. Quoted from PRAGER VOLKSZEITUNG, Prague, 25 August 1978.
22. DLF, 17 August 1975.
23. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 1 September 1977.
24. DAS PARLAMENT, Bonn, 10 January 1962.

25. Quoted from DIE WELT, 4 January 1982.
26. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 13 January 1982.
27. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 16 September 1983.
28. Ibid., 4 October 1983.
29. DLF, 11 January 1976.
30. DIE WELT, 11 March 1976.
31. Ibid., 11 September 1974.
32. SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 6 October 1974.
33. DIE WELT, 11 September 1974.
34. SPANDAUER VOLKSBLATT, West Berlin, 14 September 1974.
35. DLF, 30 November 1974.
36. Cf. TV-COURIER, 22 September 1975.
37. Cf. HANDELSBLATT, Duesseldorf, 1 April 1968.
38. DER SPIEGEL, Hamburg, No 29, 1968.
39. Cf. RUDE PRAVO, Prague, 12 September 1973.

RIAS: Counterrevolutionary, Revanchist

East Berlin JUNGE GENERATION in German No 8 Aug 84 pp 52-53

[Article by M. Klaus]

[Text] 1 June 1984: A change of manager at RIAS. Bonn's U.S. Ambassador came in especially to present to the old manager a personal letter of thanks from Reagan. The new one is now circulating his calling cards. Dr P. Schiwy, CDU, studied law, journalism and Eastern European history, started his career as a Springer correspondent, then RIAS editor and head of the "Ostpolitik" department, finally chief TV editor at Norddeutscher Rundfunk. The references are not bad. But they alone are not likely to have been a sufficient reason for his appointment. Among the characteristics that count especially in a RIAS manager, Springer's WELT mentioned "reliability, discretion but also stick-to-itiveness." A strange mix. What RIAS practices are standing behind it? RIAS belongs to USIA. How little that U.S. government office for foreign propaganda has to do with information, was made clear by its director in 1981, Reagan's intimate friend Wick: "We are in war against the Soviets, be it a de facto or a declared war." At RIAS, this order over the air for the anticommunist crusade surely caused applause. The fact is that the key idea on which the installing of RIAS was based was to turn West Berlin into a bridgehead for anticommunism, from where

the new order in the East was supposed to be "rolled back." First by propaganda, then militarily. The circa 650 full-timers at RIAS developed for it a sort of "combat journalism," as SFB admitted in 1983, not entirely without envy. Ultra-short wave, medium-wave and short-wave programs are being transmitted around the clock. RIAS counts mainly on listeners in the GDR but also in the CSSR and in Poland, and even in the socialist countries of Southeast Europe, out of range to the transmission towers in West Berlin and the FRG.

"Reliable"

Since it started its transmission on 4 September 1946 there has not been one anticommunist provocation or counterrevolutionary action for which RIAS would have failed to appear somehow as the instigator or even (as the files demonstrate) as the wirepuller. Almost every time also as the first station. Even in the afternoon of 16 June 1953 RIAS interrupted its program to devote itself exclusively to the counterrevolutionary putsch attempt in Berlin--all other Western stations first kept transmitting "normally." In October 1956 a RIAS man infiltrated into Budapest was the only one to report live of "communist battles." A coincidence? No way. Not for nothing does a "hot wire" connect RIAS and intelligence services (including their offshoots). And in August of 1961, the U.S. psychological warfare expert, E. Taylor, praised the "repeatedly shown ability" of RIAS to "organize and coordinate" hotbeds of violence, sabotage operations, escape movements and so forth.

"Reliably" RIAS also wants to play its part in Reagan's crusade. "We must tenaciously and persistently pierce smaller and larger holes through this wall," so it agitated for instance on 29 September 1983 with respect to our national boundary. Any utterance critical of socialism, any "sensation" apt to be used for anticommunist purposes, is eagerly picked up to be refurbished into ammunition against real socialism. You can rely on that, "special West Berlin RIAS programs will see to it," was the comment in FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU.

"Discreet"

The deal of RIAS--analogous to the intelligence-directed stations Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty--is to appear, possibly, to listeners in the GDR as an "in-house station," a "quasi inland service." Through sneakily deceptive knowledge of the GDR, "garnished with 'socialist background'" (SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG), a "trust capital" is to be piled up that can then be resorted to in situations of pointed class struggle. To that end, especially GDR citizens keep being "encouraged", in intelligence fashion, to make contact with RIAS: "Every 3 weeks we announce a new pseudo-address for the station." Discretion only? Revealing also is how RIAS shortly before the Polish events, "tested" its short-wave range. According to FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, it found out about it by determining the places from where answers to a most simple RIAS quiz were sent. For an outside control over Polish counterrevolutionary they used tactics RIAS had tested before, on 17 June 1953. As former RIAS manager Ewing explained: "In the early morning hours of the 17th we kept transmitting the report on what had happened at Strausberger Platz. We did not summon anyone, we only reported that a meeting was in preparation at Strausberger Platz."

"Discreet," indeed.

"Stick-to-itiveness"

RIAS press spokesman Maas: "Our job is to inform the people in the GDR as long as there is no freedom of opinion in the GDR." Which means nothing else but proclaiming, with "stick-to-itiveness," the abolition of socialist democracy and of the workers and farmers power altogether. Does that look like an "improvement of the climate" between West Berlin and the GDR?

The "stick-to-itiveness" being so pronounced, it is not astonishing that conservatives keep coming up with loyalty pledges to the continued existence of RIAS. When the new manager came in, Bonn's Inner-German Relations Ministry e.g. promised to do "all it could to maintain the station" (it is already a zealous supplier of nationalistic-revanchist "background materials," the FRG budget paying for the lion's share of RIAS expenses). And CDU's Schiwy himself? He plans to stay at the diversion course with "stick-to-itiveness": "In terms of our sense of identity, we of course are a station that intensively looks beyond our city's boundaries to what is around it. We thereby fulfil a function that often exceeds what radio stations normally have to do here in the West."

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CSO: 2300/625

SCOPE, INTERPRETATION OF FRG CRIMINAL LAW EXAMINED

GDR Charge of Revanchism

East Berlin NEUE JUSTIZ in German Vol 8 Aug 84 pp 315-318

[Article by Prof Dr H. Weber, director of department for Criminal Law and Law of Criminal Procedure at the Academy for Political Science and Jurisprudence of the GDR: "The Problem of Prosecution in Imperialist Countries"]

[Text] The new excrescence of the general crisis of capitalism also pervades criminal prosecution in the imperialist countries.¹ The manner of thought of the politicians and jurists in those countries is more and more determined by that crisis. U.S. President R. Reagan, in a speech on 28 September 1981, admitted the U.S. criminal law system had collapsed. That it did not function was obvious.²

The crisis of criminal prosecution has become an element of public life in the imperialist countries. Many bourgeois publications describe the manifestations and ramifications of that crisis without, however, getting to the root causes. Those causes are not found in the failure or inability of some institutions or civil servants but in the social system that has long been mired in a crisis itself. The crisis in criminal prosecution is an element of the crisis of that system. It is all the deeper, the more criminal prosecution is subordinated to the interests and policy of the most aggressive and reactionary forces of the monopoly bourgeoisie. Its gravest effect lies in that the imperialist state becomes increasingly incapable of responding to the people's elemental vital interests in peace, safety and comfort and in the protection from criminal assaults.

No Protection of Peace

The close link between criminal law and criminal prosecution in imperialism and the interests and policy of the most aggressive circles of the monopoly bourgeoisie and its opposition to the people's vital interests are revealed most clearly by the position of those circles on the safeguarding of peace. Increasingly, to be sure, even judges and state attorneys in the FRG are joining the struggle against NATO's military buildup and protest actions against the deployment of new U.S. first-strike weapons in Western Europe. But that does not change the fact that neither legislation nor criminal prosecution in the FRG have ever been

instruments for an effective protection of peace and of the peace movement. Peace activities by judges and state attorneys have made no inroads on jurisdiction; instead, they stand in opposition to official jurisprudence.

Rejecting the Condemnation under Criminal Law of Aggressive Wars

Preventing any consistent prosecution of war and Nazi crimes, FRG legislation and jurisprudence rule out the condemnation under criminal law of imperialist wars of aggression. If war and Nazi criminals were called to account before FRG courts at all, they were punished, at best, as individuals, against the international law principles of the IMT [expansion unknown] statute, their crimes failing to be judged in connection with imperialism's policy of aggression and war. The Nazi state was even granted the right to conduct war. This non-prosecution of war and Nazi crimes became the premise for the remilitarization of the FRG and, hence, a component in the recovery of imperialist power.³

The organs of justice in the FRG never put up any resistance to the remilitarization. The FRG needed nearly 20 years so that in 1968, under public pressure, the criminal code included Articles 80 (Preparation of Aggressive War) and 80a (Instigating Aggressive War) under one title, "Betrayal of Peace." These provisions, however, are neither used in jurisdiction nor even mentioned in the substantial juridical literature of the FRG. Nor do they have any preventive function, being merely an "alibi." The criminal law is not being used to prevent the glorification of the arms buildup policy nor an unbridled indoctrination about a "nuclear first strike" and a "limited" or "winnable" nuclear war through radio, television, high-circulation newspapers and magazines. The U.S. aggression against Grenada, e.g., was justified, even glorified, by the mass media addressing an audience of millions. In his criminal code commentary, the former noted Nazi jurist E. Dreher champions the view that "aggressive war is no criminal offense even in accordance with Article 80, so that taking part in aggressive war prepared by others, by that token, is no criminal offense either."⁴

The Position by Jurisprudence on the Peace Movement

The peace movement in imperialist states, on the other hand, enjoys no protection under law because it opposes the policy of the ruling circles that are pledged to the aggressive U.S. policy of the nuclear arms buildup. The lack of a protection under law of the peace movement thus is not just an expression of jurisprudential passivity. There are many cases where citizens have been prosecuted for advocating peace. The fight against the remilitarization was a big reason for the KPD ban in 1956 and the persecution of communists and other democratic forces on that basis. The stronger the peace movement gets, the more intensive become the attacks against it and against its representatives.

The FRG Constitutional Court lent juridical fire support to the deployment of nuclear first strike weapons in the FRG. By its ruling of 22 December 1983, the second chamber turned down the suit from several armaments opponents by resorting to the lie of the alleged Soviet threat. The ruling contends that "the decisive endangerment source" were the "decisions by the Soviet Union as a foreign sovereign state. Even if the danger of a Soviet nuclear attack was to be increased by the new weapons, the FRG could not be regarded as the

cause for this presumed new danger situation."⁵ Thereby the highest court in the FRG means to give a blessing, juridically, to the NATO military buildup policy, depict as harmless the situation made dangerous by the deployment, and deny the danger of war. That judgment denies the fact that the FRG government, by agreeing to the deployment, surrenders the FRG to the risk to be dragged into a nuclear war by the U.S. administration. The deployment has been declared constitutional, resistance against it, illegal.

In ordinary life in the FRG, many, partly rowdyish, assaults upon the peace movement are taking place, without the police or the criminal prosecution organs taking any steps against them. Instead, the attempt is being made to criminalize the peace movement efforts. The incumbent FRG minister of the interior has announced: "Ensuring internal security and legality is among the most important tasks the state has to provide for its citizens. The crucial deficit in this area lies in that the law consciousness has suffered greatly in parts of the population. That is reflected by the crime trend and also by the debate carried on on possible actions to be taken against any possible rearmament. The slogan of the intended 'nonviolent resistance' often hides the intended legal infraction."⁶

Consequently, the detriment to the law consciousness does not lie in justifying the arms buildup and propagation of nuclear war by NATO, but in the resistance against that. Even nonviolent resistance is being declared a form of violence. Peace movement actions against the nuclear war policy of the most aggressive imperialist forces are mentioned in one breath with crime, thereby to be discriminated against and branded as illegal, harmful, and ultimately as crime. This campaign of murderous appeal is meant to pave the way for persecuting the members of the peace movement. Not rarely they lose the right to work, get disciplinary fines or are set back in different ways. Bundestag deputy Bastian and 270 others taking part in a demonstration against the deployment of Pershing missiles, e.g., were given monetary fines by the Neu-Ulm county court. During the Bundestag debate on the missile deployment a nonviolent peace movement demonstration was held in Bonn in November 1983, against which the police acted in brutal force. None of the police was criminally or disciplinarily called to account although it was definite they had caused physical violence or health injuries.

To make available further criminal means to suppress the peace movement and other democratic aspirations, the FRG government on 13 July 1983 passed the draft bill for reformulating Article 125 in the FRG Criminal Code (Breach of the Peace). Accordingly, also such participants of demonstrations become criminally liable who fail to withdraw, upon being ordered by the police to do so, from a "mob" or a "segment of people" engaged in "violent activities" or who join the "call for noncompliance."⁷ Parties, trade unions, democratic organizations, lawyers, politicians, even police representatives have come out against such a stiffening of penalties.⁸

The FRG's lawyers association commented on that: "Penalizing peaceful demonstrators with the aim of fighting against persons committing violence defies the guilt principle."⁹ The national executive of the German Judges Association, with 204 against 89 votes, also turned down the amendment of Article 125 in the FRG Penal Code proposed by the FRG government.¹⁰

Extending the Range of FRG Criminal Law in Defiance of International Law

FRG legislation and criminal justice--in contravening the spirit and letter of the GDR-FRG Treaty on the Basis of Relations--keep pursuing the revanchist line on "keeping the German question open" and on the "continued existence of the German Reich." The unlawful position is taken, which is so detrimental to establishing normal relations between the GDR and the FRG, that the GDR is "integral" to the FRG and FRG criminal law also extends to the GDR.¹¹ With contempt for GDR citizenship, its citizens are regarded as Germans in the sense of Article 116 in the Basic Law, and thus as FRG citizens, to place them under its judicial sovereignty. This makes possible the criminalization of acts committed by GDR citizens on GDR territory at will, but also to protect GDR citizens who have committed crimes on GDR territory from a just penalty, as it happened, for instance, in the case of the dual-murderer Weinhold.¹²

According to the ruling from the Duesseldorf supreme district court, of 3 November 1982, the FRG justice system, in exercise of an arrogated protection right for GDR citizens, can punish GDR citizens for anything they do anywhere in the world whenever not doing so would "flagrantly contradict internationally recognized judicial political principles."¹³ Under the pretext of presumably protecting interests of GDR citizens the whole world virtually becomes then a "region of judicial interest" for the FRG. That clearly is a form of juridical aggression.

This arrogation of justice is being institutionalized through the "Salzgitter Central Registry" which is intended not only to engage in the criminalization of what GDR citizens do and take part this way in psychological warfare, but also to prepare for "X Day." The goal and political purpose of such interventionist designs by FRG legislation and jurisprudence with regard to the range of application, completely in contradiction to international law as they are, evidently is to tune the FRG citizens to what might possibly become a violent solution of the "German question." The criminal justice on these matters is aimed against the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence between states with different social orders, which makes it inimical to peace.

Capitulating to Criminality

The crisis of criminal prosecution in the imperialist countries becomes most apparent in their helplessness in view of the swelling crime rate. The explosion of crime is part of the crisis in the imperialist system. The U.S. crime rate hovers around 13 million annually. FRG police crime statistics, which also include the crime in West Berlin although that city is not a part of the FRG, shows 4,291,975 crimes for 1982. That is a 256-percent increase since 1963. That came to 6,963 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, a nearly 240-percent increase since 1963. Hamburg recorded 14,343, Bremen 13,133, and West Berlin 13,547 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. In those big cities then one of seven inhabitants commits crime annually. In addition, there still is a very high latent criminality.

The increasing criminal infestation of society in the imperialist states is an element of the crisis. The capitalist system by itself is not able to push back or at least contain the flood of crimes. That requires, as historic

development has meanwhile demonstrated, a revolutionary social transformation and the setting up of socialist social relations. The practice of criminal prosecution and the prevailing doctrine on crime and criminology in the capitalist countries proceed from the assumption that their social system is eternal, inviolable, even sacred; they are all set to defend and justify it. As capitalist society itself, so also its criminality is considered everlasting and necessary. Thus the prevailing bourgeois criminology finds its task in explaining that there must always be crime and that one has to live with the growing crime rate. It is not concerned with disclosing the social causation for crime and with finding ways to prevent and effectively fight it. The FRG criminologist G. Kaiser wrote, e.g., one should get rid of the "naive superstition" one could eradicate crime as a social mass phenomenon by social change but learn to live "not only with the atomic bomb, but also with crime."¹⁴

Progressive endeavors in criminology and their representatives become suspect. That approach was opposed, e.g., by H.-J. Schneider, who said it was the task of a criminologist to "avert or fight against criminality within this system. If he rejects or wants to eliminate the social system under which he lives, he is no criminologist but a 'busybody' the society is entitled to fend off."¹⁵

Criminologists adopting the revisionist positions are persuaded that even with the capitalist system continuing its existence crime is avoidable. In their view, the social system could (and should) be so reformed that crime can be avoided. In J. Hellmer's view, e.g., criminality is "discrepant behavior" which he wants to fight against by a large number of measures. Those measures range from enlightenment, controls, financial incentives for parents, via genuine relations between teachers and pupils, the partitioning of large communities, the appointment of a responsible person accountable to the citizens, all the way to organizing criminal proceedings establishing an interhuman equilibrium--but not, by that token, between the criminal and the government.¹⁶

Conservative ideologues, on the other hand, seek to shift the causes for crimes to individuals. U.S. President R. Reagan, e.g., contended the causes for crime had to be sought "in the arrogance of some people, and not in poverty, not in social disparities."¹⁷

According to G.-K. Kaltenbrunner, aggressiveness is "not a consequence of capitalist social relations, but a phylogenic legacy."¹⁸

Those ideologues actually glorify criminality as a "price of freedom." It is regarded as a necessary and indispensable component of public life, just as unemployment, inflation, homelessness, military rearmament and war. The ruling monopoly bourgeoisie does not care to eliminate the deeper social causes for crime. It rather accepts the disturbances of public life that come from and go along with crime than social transformations. Moreover, crime also is a rich source for profits.¹⁹

The class antagonism in the exploiter society permits no uniform overall social interest in doing away with the causes for crimes and in rigorously preventing and fighting crime. An unlimited interest in disclosing and eliminating the causes of crime and in its rigorous curtailment is known only in the workers class, its

revolutionary party and the working people allied with it, they being the main victims of criminality. The ruling monopoly bourgeoisie, on the other hand, increasingly seeks to heap the negative effects of criminality onto the workers class and the other working people.

In practice, the contemporary bourgeois states demonstrate the relation with crime by two fundamental facts:

First, there is no overall social and governmental crime prevention.²⁰

Second, crime is fought, if at all, exclusively by measures opposing individual criminals.

The conservative side is raising demands for expanding and stiffening mandatory penalties and more discipline. For all that, it becomes less and less possible seriously to prosecute the massive crimes.

The proportion of crimes actually prosecuted is small and is diminishing further. In the United States in 1980, of circa 13.3 million crimes, only 19 percent was resolved, in France, of 2.6 million, only 40 percent, in Austria, of almost 350,000, only 55 percent. In the early 1950's, the resolution rate in the FRG was still 75 percent, in the 1960's, 50 percent, and in 1982, still merely 45 percent. In the FRG at present, only one-tenth of the crimes lead to convictions, which means that 90 percent of the crimes is not being prosecuted. The fact is that criminality as a mass phenomenon--much like mass unemployment--is primarily being registered and administered but not effectively fought.

Inequality and Injustice

The inequality and injustice aggravated with the general crisis of capitalism is also reflected in the criminal prosecution. The heaviest crimes are not prosecuted or only with great reluctance. That is true of war crimes and crimes against humanity as well as environmental and economic offenses. Though economic offenses cause multiples of damage in traditional property offenses, between 50 and 70 percent of those crimes bring prosecutions that are dropped on grounds of being insignificant (even when the damage comes to between DM 50,000 and 250,000),²¹ in the FRG.

The term "white collar" crime includes stock exchange speculations, tax evasion, false profit-and-loss statements and things like that. Legislators and courts put a protective veneer over the criminal machinations of monopolist entrepreneurs. Typical of that are the so-called anti-trust laws in the United States. The Sherman Act of 1974 threatens with a prison sentence up to 3 years or fines up to \$ 100,000 for the misuse of entrepreneur activity. But the profits the corporations make are vastly larger than the threatening penalties. When the Ford Motors Company, e.g., got a \$ 35,000 fine in 1981 for its manipulations, it had already made a profit of \$ 140 million. The Westing House Company got a \$300,000 fine for illegal contracts. Yet that was only one percent of the profits made from those contracts.

The liberal approach by bourgeois criminal procedure is also shown in organized crime. Of the 1,762 Mafia members who were hauled before the court in New York between 1960 and 1970 only 44.7 percent got convicted. U.S. monopoly entrepreneurs count on annual net profits from the Mafia between \$ 40 and 48 million. According to the Japanese police, Mafia profits there came to one billion yen in 1978 alone.

Great is the inequality in violent crime. Especially such offenses as murder and physical violence are mostly referred to by bourgeois ideologues as evidence for class neutrality and of equality in prosecution. Yet in no other field have as many lessons in justifying criminal behavior been worked out and practiced in capitalist society ever as in the field of violent crime. That refers to the non-prosecution of tens of thousands of war and Nazi criminals, the justification or, at least, the belittling of violent crimes on antisocialist grounds (e.g. the murdering of border soldiers) or of offenses of violence committed by the police against citizens (e.g. progressive demonstrators).²³

Legislators and courts in the capitalist countries also seek to curtail the criminal liability of entrepreneurs who infringe labor safety provisions. The range of application of the labor safety law passed in England in 1963 is confined to offices, warehouses and the premises of railway enterprises. The criminal liability of entrepreneurs for health damage provides for a maximum of monetary fines of 300 pound sterling. The bureaucratic structure and working methods of the organs that have to supervise the application of labor safety provisions make criminal prosecution still more difficult.

Mandatory penalties are clearly concentrated on members of the working classes and strata. In practical procedures in the FRG it is especially that aspect of the inequality that clearly stands out, although to the outside legality and equality are being proclaimed. Criminologists and law scientists there unabashedly admit in part that the workers class and the other working people are clearly disadvantaged by the criminal laws. Their assumption is that "criminal acts are expected especially by those without property and power, who have no regular jobs and live under irregular conditions. The associates in the social control authorities expect no acts of a criminal nature from those 'whose property and power they are meant to maintain.'"²⁴

It is often pointed out in this context that state controls, especially police controls, are carried out especially where illegal acts by members of the so-called substrata are anticipated, whereas the rulers hardly ever get any supervision. The monopolies' business practices are virtually free from state control, so that what we get is a criminalization of the working people and a decriminalization of the ruling upper class.

The equality in legal prosecution in the FRG also is cut back through the expansion of the opportunity principle introduced into the Penal Code on 2 March 1974 (especially Article 19). That makes it possible for the state attorney's office to drop a criminal prosecution, without any further check and at will (i.e. without specific legal criteria) when the property against which a crime was committed is fairly insubstantial. In accordance with the basic class-bound position of imperialist criminal prosecution discussed, that not only leads to a massive non-prosecution of crimes committed, but also to granting privileges to the propertied strata.

In part, how they deal with it is made dependent on payoff, which can be made only by the rich.²⁵ That all comes down to a redemption from criminal liability.

Xenophobia, chauvinism and racism also have their part to play in the imperialist states' criminal proceedings. Some FRG judges, e.g., rated "the quality of being a foreigner as aggravating."²⁶ In the United States, the whites sit on judgment over the colored and give them disadvantages of every sort. Inmates in U.S. prisons are predominantly colored Americans. Their proportion keeps growing.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. M. Schmidt, "A New Phase in the General Crisis of Capitalism," EINHEIT, 1983, No 7, pp 640 ff. On the crisis in crime fighting in imperialism as an element of the general crisis of capitalism, cf. J. Lekschas/H. Harland/R. Hartmann/G. Lehmann, "Kriminologie, Theoretische Grundlagen und Analysen" [Criminology--Theoretical Principles and Analyses], Berlin, 1983, pp 131 ff; "Crime and the Crisis in Crime Fighting in Imperialism," BERICHT DER HUMBOLDT-UNIVERSITAET, 1982, no 13.
2. U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Washington, 12 October 1981, pp 39 ff.
3. Cf. P. Przybylski, "Zwischen Galgen und Amnestie" [Between the Gallows and Amnesty], Berlin, 1983, pp 61 ff.
4. E. Dreher, "Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze (Beck'sche Kurz-Kommentare)" [The Penal Code and Supplementary Laws (Beck's Brief Commentaries)], Vol 10, 38th edition, Munich, 1978, footnote 9 to Article 80, p 470.
5. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 23 December 1983.
6. Ibid., 19 July 1983.
7. Ibid., 8 July 1983.
8. Ibid., 14 July 1983.
9. SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Stuttgart, 14 July 1983.
10. DEUTSCHE RICHTERZEITUNG, Cologne/West Berlin/ Bonn/ Munich, 1983, No 11, supplement.
11. Cf. E. Oeser/H. Luther, "The FRG Has Severed Relations with International Law (Comments on an FRG Court Ruling on the Range of Application of FRG Criminal Law)," NEUE JUSTIZ, 1981, No 8, pp 343 ff; G. Seidel, "The Link Between International Law and National Law in the Light of Judicial Practice in the FRG," Ibid., 1984, No 1, pp 17 ff.
12. Cf. E. Buchholz/G. Wieland, "The Weinhold Case--A Chain of Infractions by the FRG Justice System," Ibid., 1977, No 1, pp 22ff.
13. NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, Munich/Frankfurt/Main, 1982, No 22, p 1277; cf. G. Seidel, op. cit., p 20.

14. G. Kaiser, "Modern Criminology and Its Critics," "Kriminologie--morgen, Kriminologische Schriftenreihe," Hamburg, 1964, Vol 14, p 96.
15. H.-L. Schneider, "The Current Situation of Criminology in German-speaking Countries," JURISTENZEITUNG, Tuebingen, 1973, No 18, p 578.
16. J. Hellmer, "Verdirbt die Gesellschaft?--Kriminalitaet als zwischen-menschliches Verhalten " [Is Society Rotting Away?--Crime as Inter-human Behavior], Zurich, 1981, pp 16 ff and 100 to 103.
17. "Speech by the American President on Violent Crime," TAGESSPIEGEL, West Berlin, 29 September 1981.
18. Quoted in F. J. Strauss, "Gebote der Freiheit" [Precepts of Liberty], Munich, 1980, p 149.
19. Cf. D. Seidel/G. Wiesel, "Krimineller Profit--profitable Kriminalitaet" [Criminal Profit-- Profitable Crime], Berlin, 1982.
20. Cf. J. Lekschas et alia, op. cit., p 24.
21. J. Meyer, "Discussion Report on the Working Session of the Working Team for Criminal Law Comparison of the Society for Law Comparisons," ZEITSCHRIFT FUER DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, West Berlin/New York, 1982, p 238.
22. That term, coined by E. H. Sutherland, originally entailed crimes committed by means of exploiting higher job activities. Cf. E. H. Sutherland, "White Collar Crime," New York, 1949.
23. Cf. H. Weber, "Violent Crime and Criminal Policy in the FRG," NEUE JUSTIZ, 1977, No 17, p 595.
24. R. Driebold, "Sozialtherapie im Strafvollzug" [Social Therapy in the Administration of Justice], Weinheim/Basel, 1981, p 15; cf. also "Jobless Youths Are Punished More Often and Harder in the FRG," NEUE JUSTIZ, 1982, No 10, p 442.
25. Cf. R. Daehn, "Caprice in the Practice of Criminal Prosecution in the FRG," Ibid., 1979, No 1, p 30; G. Kaiser, "Opportunities for Fighting Minor Crimes in the FRG," ZEITSCHRIFT FUER DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, 1978, p 900; F. M. Berghauer, "Settling Economic Crimes by State Attorney's Offices and Courts," Ibid., 1977, pp 1015 ff.
26. Cf. J. Arnold/E. Buchholz, "The Role of the Theories on Adequate Punishment in the FRG," NEUE JUSTIZ, 1983, No 6, pp 241 f.
27. U.-O. Sievering et al, "Alternativen zur Freiheitsstrafe" [Alternatives for Prison Sentences], Frankfurt/Main, 1982, p 21; G. Kaiser, "Strafvollzug im europaeischen Vergleich" [Execution of Sentences by European Comparison] Darmstadt, 1983, p 205.

Conciliatory Reaction by FRG

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 15 Aug 84 p 4

[Article by P. J. Winters]

[Text] "FRG legislation and criminal justice--in contravening the spirit and letter of the GDR-FRG Treaty on the Basis of Relations--keep pursuing the revanchist line on 'keeping the German question open' and on the 'continued existence of the German Reich.'" This accusation, which is not new, is raised by Professor Weber of the Academy for Political Science and Jurisprudence of the GDR in the East Berlin monthly for socialist law and legality, NEUE JUSTIZ. He reproaches the FRG for taking an "unlawful" position that is "detrimental" to establishing normal relations between the GDR and the FRG, to the effect that the GDR is "integral" to the FRG and FRG criminal law also extends to the GDR. With contempt for GDR citizenship, its citizens were regarded as "Germans in the sense of the Basic Law" and thus as "FRG citizens," to place them under its judicial sovereignty, writes Weber, who is the director of the department for Criminal Law and Law of Criminal Procedure at the Academy in Potsdam-Babelsberg. This made possible the criminalization of acts committed by GDR citizens on GDR territory at will, but also to protect GDR citizens who have committed crimes on GDR territory from a just penalty.

In this context Weber refers to the Weinhold case, that deserted from the GDR who, when he defected to the West in 1975, killed two GDR border guards and then got a prison sentence of 5 1/2 years in Essen. His remarks are, however, also connected with the Weissgerber case. Frank Weissgerber, 23 years of age, is now on trial before a large chamber of the Hamburg district court on charges of murder and heavy robbery. The charge against Weissgerber is that he, together with an accomplice, on 8 October 1982 in Magdeburg Bezirk in the GDR, strangled with a cable a 34-year old technician and robbed him of M 34,000. While the accomplice got a life sentence from the Magdeburg district court, Weissgerber managed to escape to the FRG in January 1983. He has been under detention in Hamburg since August 1983. The GDR has asked several times for Weissgerber to be "extradited," yet the Hamburg general public prosecutor has refused handing Weissgerber over to the GDR, not last because he would have to expect a death sentence in the GDR. Just before the Hamburg trial started, the head of the GDR mission chief in Bonn, Moldt, protested to the state minister in the Federal Chancellery, Jenninger, against Weissgerber's retention.

This topical matter of controversy must be recalled when one reads Weber's article. The criminal law professor, while writing his article, probably did not mean to support the "revanchism" reproaches of Moscow's PRAVDA against the FRG, published as polemics against Bonn's Germany policy and Honecker's Western policy, let alone to disseminate them, in opposition to official utterances in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and to the SED leadership's attitude. PRAVDA's propaganda offensive only seems to find a spokesman in Professor Weber. His article in NEUE JUSTIZ, presumably written before, neither means that the GDR leadership is knuckling under the PRAVDA attacks nor that there are forces in the GDR that would seriously want to thwart Honecker's Western policy. It would be completely off the track to speak of an opposition to Honecker after the SED

Politburo was expanded in late May. Rather, on the occasion of a topical dispute between the two Germanys, the GDR's position on a matter of principle is once again presented, without the settlement of this matter of principle in favor of the GDR being turned into a precondition for accords between them. After all, Honecker's Western policy does not mean the GDR has changed its opinion on matters of principle. On the contrary, it keeps insisting on its standpoint, as spelled out in Honecker's Gera demands of October 1980. Yet it evidently is willing right now to bracket differences of opinion on matters of principle and deal with Bonn in practical terms.

Thus Weber only presents well-known GDR theses in his article in polemicizing against a Duesseldorf supreme district court ruling of 3 November 1982 and writing that, according to this ruling, the FRG justice system could, in exercise of its "arrogated protection right for GDR citizens," punish GDR citizens for anything they do anywhere in the world whenever not doing so would "flagrantly contradict internationally recognized judicial political principles," as the FRG had said. Under the pretext of protecting interests of GDR citizens, the whole world had virtually been declared a region of FRG judicial interest.

This 'arrogation of justice' was institutionalized through the Salzgitter Central Registry, which was intended not only to engage in the criminalization of what GDR citizens do and take part this way in psychological warfare, but also to prepare for "X Day." Weber's conclusion: The goal and political purpose of such "interventionist" designs by FRG legislation and jurisprudence with regard to the range of application, contravening international law as they do, evidently was to "tune the FRG citizens to what might possibly become a violent solution of the 'German question.'" Jurisdiction on these matters was aimed against the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence between states with differing social orders, which made it "inimical to peace."

5885

CSO: 2300/619

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

FULL LEGAL IMMUNITY FOR CITIZENS UPHOLDING LAW, ORDER

East Berlin PRESSE-INFORMATIONEN in German No 89, 2 Aug 84 p 5

[Article by D. Plath, prosecuting attorney, Office of General Prosecuting Attorney: "Personal Involvement in Public Order and Safety is Protected Under the Law"]

[Text] More and more citizens in our country through different ways and means are getting involved in the order, cleanliness and safety in their residential areas and hometowns. They have a large share in protecting law and legality to a still higher extent and in that people feel comfortable. They are launching these activities in enforcing municipal and communal regulations increasingly as an element of the citizens initiative, "More beautiful towns and communities--Join-in!" which was sponsored by the National Front of the GDR.

Our localities are beautiful not only because new things evolve everywhere, but especially by maintaining, cultivating, guarding and protecting everything so that all people can enjoy it. That applies to apartments and houses, pleasure-grounds, parks and other recreational facilities and to public institutions, to the whole field of public life. That also is part of the work of the National Front and of the arbitration commissions. Order and safety activists, public order groups of the FDJ and in schools, and the volunteer German People's Police assistants are engaged in it. Other citizens also, who are not members of such volunteer organizations, are doing more and more for public order and safety. With a sense of responsibility they are guarding all that which we have produced in common. In many cases already they have, through brave and resolute action, prevented misdemeanors or assisted in catching offenders. Such citizens get a high public tribute. Not a few of them have been awarded and honored by the German People's Police or the Public Prosecutor's Office.

Our state, finding its basic concern in the well-being of the people, moreover has comprehensively protected under law such energetic and courageous citizens. If for reasons of their doing something for public order and safety someone abuses them or threatens them with abuse, he could incur severe punishment. Article 214 of the Penal Code provides a prison sentence up to 3 years for that.

If a citizen acting on behalf of public order and safety incurs damage, he is granted social welfare and financial aid. Article 326 of the Civil Code offers clear stipulations for such compensation. Accordingly, citizens who, out of public responsibility, provide aid in accidents and disasters, act for the

protection of the citizens' life or health, or on behalf of public order and safety, and suffer damage thereby, are entitled to compensation for all their efforts from the guilty party and to be compensated for any disadvantages incurred thereby. They present such claims to State Insurance.

Social insurance guarantees extensive social protection for health injuries. Physical and health injuries due to the fact that a citizen protects other people against physical abuse are tantamount to labor accidents. The full amount of sick pay at a clip of the net average wages is paid for the duration of the disability. That was settled by the ordinance on expanding insurance protection for accidents in the exercise of public, cultural or athletic activity, as of 11 April 1973.

Sometimes the question is raised: Could someone not be called to account also who, acting on behalf of public order and safety, causes damage to others in self-defense? The answer is no. Someone who wards off abuse against himself or others or against the socialist political or public order in a manner commensurate with the severity of the abuse acts on behalf of socialist society and its legality and commits no criminal offense. That is set down in the Penal Code, Article 17.

5885

CSO: 2300/618

THEATER TO ADDRESS MAJOR ISSUES, GUARD AGAINST OVERSIMPLIFICATION

East Berlin THEATER DER ZEIT in German No 8 Aug 84 pp 10-12

[Article by M. Meyer, deputy minister, Ministry for Culture: "Encouraging Attitude Towards Life"]

[Text] The atmosphere and events these days confirm the workshop has become indispensable to us; holding it was worthwhile.

Workshop to us means deriving the criteria and standpoints in working with contemporary national dramas from the social mission placed on dramaturgy and gaging them critically against the practical theater efforts. For that reason, the questions of artistic achievement and of the responsibility of the theater people and of the authors held the focal point in all meetings. In the 35th year of the GDR it was being tested how new dramas meet the demands of our time, how the specific contribution dramaturgy makes to the struggles of our time can become more effective, and how social relations must be established and expanded to strengthen the resonance of theater work. Results and attitudes conveyed here through the performances and discussions express the commitment to the work assumed by authors and theater personnel in the last two years.

Tribute has already been paid several times to how extensively and multiformly theater people and authors assumed their responsibility in the Karl Marx Year for socially significant events and processes and how much they have done for the peace struggle. Thereby they achieved great political, moral and emotional effects, also or especially because the theater's opportunities were used extensively. That the responsibility for safeguarding peace and strengthening socialism has grown also expressed itself in the choice of works making a contribution to these themes that sustain and advance mankind or are making it possible to relate to these matters. Along with this greater commitment, we notice a growth in political and artistic programming in theater work, more deliberate decisions on why and for what purpose a certain play is necessary just now and can be stimulating for a given audience in a given territory--or within a certain field of reference--and also a more definite effort to work and schedule works that are substantive through more conceptual and a practical long-range planning.

The workshop has shown that, and it stands confirmed by the public resonance of productions in its theaters as well as in Leipzig. It confirms that dramaturgy makes a productive and irreplaceable contribution to the process of publicly

ascertaining a sense of identity when it further develops its socialist profile and takes its clues from the interests of society, which always amount to advancing on our socialist path and strengthening our state, the GDR. New works and their manner of being staged have a great share in shaping this profile. That, however, presupposes that the contemporary drama gains more of a representative national function, relates more to crucial social developmental processes, opens up, time and again, to the idea of internationalism, and makes a greater use, and forms, the rich variety of its genres and types to satisfy the extensive needs and requirements of the spectators.

The debate on the criteria and measures for a national drama and its interpretation on our stages has lately been more closely connected than before with the discussion of our value concepts. The workshop made a practical contribution to that discussion. Performances we have seen gave us more of a view and a sharper sense for the intricate process of perceiving political responsibility and for the artistic qualification, commitment and capacity through which GDR theater speaks up. What with all the pro and con, what seems to be important, in particular, about these performances to us is that they express an encouraging and loyal stance toward life today, in this socialist society, in this our GDR. With all the problems that came up, which did not shun contradictions and risks to life--mainly in connection with the large issues in our time--they convey a private and social sense of life to which the spectator can relate as it activates him and aids him in his efforts to come to grips with problems and resolve them.

The performances oriented us to the development of personal and social partnership as a necessary prerequisite for social developmental processes; they strengthen our sense of that peace is indispensable and call upon us to do our share in safeguarding it. They are orienting us to the political, social and personal value concepts in our lives, and they convey to us through their artistic quality the use of dramaturgy and also the pleasure and fun in plays. The latter we should always keep in mind as something typical and specific of theater.

Any new work will, not last, be judged on how well it succeeds in making the inseparable connection between peace and socialism perceptible. That touches on crucial problems in our further development, the social activity of collectivity and human awareness. We know that the revolutionary transformation of society is impossible without changing the people themselves. In this connection, definite expectations of clear guidelines for the social debate and the forming of personal standpoints are placed on new works and their performances. Our theater has an educated, self-assured, party-minded and, above all, receptive audience. The audience itself, like the theater, shares in shaping the socialist reality in which it seeks to realize its hopes, yearnings and ideals, in which it carries out its conflicts, test situations, victories and defeats. For that it demands opportunities for identification and for contradiction, a public communication that is possible only in the theater, without belittling contradictions, blocks and blemishes, but also without turning them into absolutes.

In these matters there are many productive relations among theater people, authors and the public, but also others that do not function when theater conceptions and social expectations are not placed in conformity with each other. Thus there

definitely is a double meaning in Armin Stolper's question what prevented us from putting our life correctly on the stage. The great response that question found proves it hits the mark in our common everyday work. After all, it touches on the question of world-outlook, party-mindedness and artistic mastery as on that of the work relations between the theater, the author and their social partners. Also the attempt of an answer of principle, which was tried yesterday in the presidial meeting of the theater association, would always again have to refer to concrete practical examples, it seems to me, to the necessary issue-taking, the intellectual partnership give-and-take in the process of developing and producing new plays.

I do think that the workshop with its contributions can provide encouragement for Armin Stolper's question--as far as the quality of things available is concerned, the wealth of problems and the ways and means of treating them, as well as the dedication of the theaters and their public partners in the work process is concerned, through which they have contested for artistic results. Whether and how our contemporary drama will be able to meet the challenges of the 1980's, that will depend on how well the authors and theater producers succeed in comprehending the suggestive historic events in deepening--in terms of our party orientation--the content of socialist ideas in the works and their productions. A "dramaturgy of small steps," a merely admonitory or warning pose, cannot help us aggressively enough in strengthening the capacity of socialism and guarding the peace. Contradictions and conflicts are not truly fashioned if they are resolved, through inadmissible simplification, as a contrast between good and evil or disintegrate into a dullness, when no development and shaping of individuality and of the social environment any longer is possible. Attitudes of resignation, passivity or recalcitrance do not conform with the historically grounded optimism of our world-outlook. What we have to discover and shape are the large and stirring fields of dialectical tension in current social processes while focusing on human productivity and the capability and desire for responsibility. Coming to grips with these questions, as we carried it on at the workshop, seems to me a lengthy process in the course of which we have to arrive at common viewpoints.

Time and again it was pointed out in the discussion, and I want to reiterate it again, that the intricate intellectual and aesthetic production problems of authors and theater people must depend on a sympathetic and stimulating partnership with state executives and social bodies. That surely is a necessary demand for both sides. One knows the theaters that gave guest performances here have had diverse cooperation experiences in their work. If they developed fruitfully and early, concerning the work itself, and where disputes always started from the assumption that eventually there was to be a performance, a confidential relationship evolved that will still provide a basis for the theater and the author when developmental problems become complicated. Yet only then it becomes possible for working processes on plays and their staging to contribute to the forming of ensembles and for deriving impulses for further work. I think in this sense capacities must be more resolutely combined and that for major projects, as has been the case in the last 2 years, the ministry and the theater association have to support the theaters and their territorial partners. Yesterday's theater association meeting referred to has proposed some other worthwhile points about such cooperation.

What with all the personal responsibility, an attitude of encouragement and a steady commitment to contemporary national dramas, which we have to demand from all the partners involved in this process, I am still not so sure that precisely these efforts will always be subject to dispute. Only through consistent intellectual, ideological and artistic consensus can we make headway. Above and beyond the demands of everyday, social and historic occasions such as the 35th GDR anniversary, the 40th anniversary of the liberation in 1985, the 11th SED Congress and the theater congress as well in its own perimeter will time and again inquire of all of us who bear responsibilities for the theater what we have to bring in for the continued shaping of our socialist society, the strengthening of our state and, hence, the preservation of peace.

5885

CSO: 2300/626

PROMINENT AUTHORS FAIL TO PARTICIPATE IN DRAMA CONTEST

East Berlin THEATER DER ZEIT in German No 8 Aug 84 pp 12-15

[Article by D. Goerne: "Increase in Courage and Experience"]

[Excerpt] "Old foundations are honored, yet one must not surrender the right also at times to lay new ones somewhere." Goethe it was who arrived at that realization in his "Maxims and Reflections." And Gerhard Hauptmann, who was spiritually close in many respects to the great man in Weimar, points out: "We know standstill in matters of art already means retrogression--thus we must bravely move ahead."

Both quotations are conveniently used for my topic. Who would deny that every new script written for the theater faces the reservoir of extant literature as a "new foundation"--provided, of course, the author takes himself, his responsibility, and us, his partners, seriously--but then must, with all the respect for what has been done already, pose some surprising, even uncomfortable, questions. Standstill can thereby be avoided. That Gerhart Hauptmann surely was right in saying in this context one had to move ahead "bravely," we all can confirm by our many own experiences, all of us who feel committed to our country's new socialist dramaturgy.

In his speech at the SED Central Committee social science conference in December last year, Professor Kurt Hager once again emphatically pointed out that the "shaping of the developed socialist society by no means runs in a straight line. It calls for surmounting many difficulties and always again solving new problems resulting from the changing internal and external conditions. Contradictions in socialism are nothing negative, are no blemishes. Were we to think they were, it could come about that contradictions arising are not spotted in time or are disguised, which might only aggravate them. We let ourselves be guided by the Marxist-Leninist theory and method, which regards objective contradictions as a developmental law of any society, hence also of the socialist society, and demands their thorough study from the social scientists, the disclosure and effect of the frequently intertwined contradictions and their resolution in the sense of continued social progress and of further strengthening socialism."

It seems evident to me that these words, directed at our country's social scientists, also emphatically put the theater people, the authors and their interpreters under obligation. Of course we do know that direct and immediately obvious changes in social processes can never be expected of the theater. Nor will any

given spectator, however much he may be fascinated by what goes on on the stage, in principle, leave the performance as a different person, "reborn," as it were, by the story as told on the stage. The hopes that he might, which pervade all history down to the present, and which always overestimate the effects a theater can have, have always turned out to be illusory. As a matter of fact, the effect of the theater is only mediately productive: in that the partners in the audience are stirred and caused to meditate on it (literally so, and still long after the theater experience is over), in that the theater permits no insouciance, demands and encourages activity, compels taking sides. Schiller, commenting on this effect, spoke of a "splendid increase in courage and experience." And Alexander Gelman put it bluntly when he wrote: "For normal and fully valid living each of us simply needs not too slight a dosis of dramatic impressions. Otherwise a mind sours."

For drawing up a balance-sheet under this aspect, redefining in the 35th year of the GDR the state and capacity of socialist theater, its dramaturgy and its authors, and inducing authors and theater producers to make their contribution to the further development and strengthening of our republic by means of new plays--all these considerations brought it about that the Ministry for Culture and the Theater Producers Association decided to sponsor between 1 March 1983 and 29 February 1984 a "contest for new stage works" in drama on the subject "GDR Concrete." The authors (and the theaters together with them) were asked for new plays "presenting the revolutionary transformation of the GDR in its whole variety and conflict-rich development and daily life with its struggles, victories and defeats, and raising new ideological, ethical-moral and social questions. The centerpiece in this artistic issue-taking should be given to the leadership role of the workers class in constructing real socialism in the GDR." The wealth and beauty of human life in socialism were to be portrayed in these new plays as much as the responsibility all have to contribute to the safeguarding of peace and the strengthening and protection of the GDR.

To recall once again this point of departure seemed important to me. The outcome of the contest is now before us; it initially calls for two comments: First, it turns out that very many important authors in our country failed to participate in the contest. That, secondly, is in contrast to the fact, however, that very many more or less unknown authors did participate, and among them were many who certainly should be able to count on the theaters' interest in them in the future.

The jury judging the contest by no means wanted to put a negative light on this serious shift in customary relations. To be sure, given this result, questions, unanimously accepted by all the jurors, arose about their quality of distinction: for strictly speaking, "praiseworthy" plays in terms of the contest announcement were nowhere in the whole lot. There were several plays, to be sure, deserving of attention and regard both for their selection of topics and the artistic-aesthetic means of portrayal used, forming a grand design for the theater. The jury thought it unavoidable to react to this special situation adequately and sensitively and thus decided to give equal treatment to the best submissions and honor the authors, together with the theaters working with them, through appropriate awards on an even keel. This way--that at least is the firm conviction of the jury--the different plays, which actually are incomparable in terms of what is excellent and unfinished in them, can get the tribute they undoubtedly deserve as grand designs. Simultaneously, this decision is connected

with the conviction that most of the plays to be awarded have still to be worked on--a task confronting the authors and the theaters working with them alike.

Altogether 70 works were submitted. In accordance with the criteria set down in the announcement, the jury decided to consider three of them more closely for awards. Another 22 plays or authors seemed promising to the jurors for their subjects or the artistic means of writing. Another 32 works, however, remained in every respect below the minimal demands of the contest.

Twelve submissions had to be regarded as "inappropriate for the contest." Either their subjects did not relate to the GDR and its history in the broadest sense or they had already been published before the contest began. One work was removed from all consideration because its copyright was uncertain.

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MISSED OPPORTUNITIES, CIRCUMSTANCES OF 1944 REVIEWED

Options of 1944 Discussed

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 28 Jun 84 p 8

[Article by Gabor Kurti: "Missed Opportunities and What Happened in 1944"]

[Text] To what extent was all that happened in Hungary in 1944 necessary? What was, what would have been, possible? In short: did conditions exist for events to take a different turn? These and similar questions came up among the participants in the conference organized recently by the Association of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists concerning the events of the first half of 1944. The speakers were well-known historians: Dr Mihaly Korom, Dr Erzsebet Strassenreiter, Dr Eva Nemes Beranne, Dr Elek Karsai and Dr Ignac Olvedi.

It was a fortuitous idea on the part of the organizers to select as the theme of the main report the state of Hungarian society in 1944, for from the standpoint of possibilities the year can be sized up only in light of this. From Dr Mihaly Korom's thorough research the data on the 1941 census of the population almost sprang to life. Of the 9.3 million inhabitants of Hungary, 26.7 percent were workers; by 1944 approximately one-half of these were working in large factories. Agricultural laborers comprised 19.2 percent, the urban petite bourgeoisie (craftsmen and shopkeepers) 5.4 percent, the small and medium peasantry (with 1-25 cadastral holds) 21.3 percent. The proportion of the exploiting classes was 8.1 percent, that is, 750,000 people, and of these 64,000 were medium and large industrialists.

From the preceding data, and from the fact that the size of the national bourgeoisie was tiny, the conclusion may be drawn that the societal background taken as whole could have been propitious for a popular front policy. At the same time it was quite characteristic of the conditions at the time that, compared to the bourgeois democratic states, the number of those in public service was quite high in Hungary. In 1941, 127,000 were serving in the army and the police, 77,000 in the civil service.

Dr Mihaly Korom also dispelled one of the myths connected with the period. Since 75 percent of the capital working in Hungary was of domestic origin, and since German capital did not have itself heavily represented in the

remainder, we may in no wise maintain that in respect to the economy Hungary would have gotten into the kind of dependent situation that would have justified and determined the German orientation.

There are certain similar illusions current concerning the size and possibilities of the anti-fascist prisoner-of-war movement. The organization of the movement got started only in the spring of 1942, and the Communist Party started agitation among prisoners-of-war with approximately 50 members altogether. Their paper, the IGAZ SZO [True Word], first appeared on 10 October 1942. In July of 1943, the idea of organizing the first Hungarian Legion was brought up, but the acquisition of subaltern officers represented one of the hardest nuts to crack. In its declaration, two generals being held as prisoners-of-war, Marcell Stomm and Laszlo Deseo, responding to a request, "authorized" the political movement of prisoners-of-war.

Their standpoint was positive to the extent that they urged withdrawal from the German alliance and Hungary's ending the war. For two months Rakosi pressed them to come out against Horthy, but in vain. After that Rakosi delivered his famous "Who Is Responsible" speech and thereby alienated not only the two generals but numerous prisoners-of-war as well from the idea of a joint struggle, for the proclamation of opposition to Horthy was in reality not yet timely at that time. In the fall of 1944 the matter of the legion was shelved, after the Allies opposed the creation of a Hungarian division on Soviet territory....

Dr Erzsebet Strassenreiter's presentation offered a basis for judging the extent to which the workers in large factories could have been the basis for a democratic alternative. The nearly half-million workers in large factories were heterogeneous in composition; during the war and the counter-revolutionary terror they experienced losses from which they could recover only with difficulty, and the ideology of the Horthy system was not without effect on them. The labor policy of the ruling class aimed at the workers' acting out their revolutionism in wage struggles. It was helped, as it were, to achieve this by the fact that the Social Democrats did not regard the political struggle as timely.

In 1944 ever-worsening life circumstances and increasing inflation characterized the situation of the working class; following the German occupation in March, however, the conditions in the war factories were made even more severe. In spite of this the workers more and more frequently turned against the measures of the ruling class; they sabotaged production, and later they attempted to block the dismantling and transfer of the factories. Only a small number of them, however, went as far as armed opposition, the main reason for this being that the political and organizational preconditions for it were lacking.

But what about the army? How can its for all practical purposes idle sufferance of the German occupation of its country be explained? Dr Ignac Olvedi explored several viewpoints in connection with this. It is a fact that the German leadership originally wanted to disband the Hungarian army,

then to merge it into German troop units; during the negotiations between Horthy and Hitler at Klessheim, however, they did not get around to a discussion of this. The disarming of the Hungarians was not in the event necessary; moreover, one week after the occupation Hitler was already authorizing the use of Hungarian troops to halt the Soviet advance.

In this regard the behavior of the officer corps was decisive. The German orientation of the general staff, that is to say, remained unbreakable after the occupation. The purge originally planned by the Germans could be dispensed with; altogether, it came down to a shift of one or two people. The change in the military situation naturally inclined the soberer members of the officer corps to reflection, but in the spring of 1944 they had not committed themselves to organization or to action. They adopted a wait-and-see point of view; only in a close circle of friends did they voice their reservations. It is also necessary to take into consideration that at this time the democratic forces did not yet have connections to the officer corps. In summary therefore we may say that it is an illusion to think that the officers were merely waiting for the order for resistance to the Germans.

Naturally 1944 cannot be viewed merely in the light of missed opportunities. What actually happened also demands further research. Dr Elek Karsai spoke on his latest research concerning the deportation of the Jews. True, the instructions of the Germans concerning the deportation were carried out by the Hungarian administration--but, after all, the local administration collaborated in the deportations everywhere in occupied Europe. Archival investigations prove that while the anti-Jewish measures of some sub-prefects and chief constables actually matched the level of the central decrees, elsewhere they delayed their execution and, within the given constraints, they employed as humane methods as possible. While recalling the horrors of the deportations, we should not forget, either, that 10,000 of the persecuted found refuge with non-Jewish families.

The presentations at the conference added further nuances to the picture of 1944 formed in our consciousness, last but not least in that they contributed to historical clear-sightedness.

POWs Did Not Join Soviets in 1943-44

Budapest MOZGO VILAG in Hungarian Jun 84 pp 67-73

[Article by Sandor Szakaly: "Marcel Stomm and the 'Hungarian Legion'"]

[Text] In domestic publishing, in memoirs, fiction and historiography as well, there crops up from time to time the affair of the so-called "Hungarian legion" and in connection with it the name of Lieutenant General Marcel Stomm, the former commander of the III Corps of the 2nd Hungarian Army that was routed on the Don.

Writers, chroniclers and historians are seeking the answer to the question, why did the creation in the Soviet Union of a Hungarian anti-fascist military formation composed of volunteers not succeed in 1943-44? For the anti-Hitler,

anti-fascist movement developing among Hungarian prisoners-of-war could have assured a basis for the organizing work that began in the summer of 1943.

Those seeking the reasons for the failure represent two views. One opinion, already formulated at the end of the 1940's, holds Lieutenant General Stomm and his associates--Brigadier General Deseo, Staff Major Csatho, etc--responsible, saying that they did not support the spontaneous effort begun from below, and that they thwarted the establishment of the legion. According to the other view, it was the parochialism and inflexibility of the leadership of the Hungarian Communist emigration in Moscow, and Matyas Rakosi personally, that was the reason that the legion was not ultimately formed, despite so many efforts. (The representatives of this latter view also recognize the crucial role of Lieutenant General Stomm, the senior in rank among the Hungarian prisoners-of-war).

On the basis of our research, we believe that we can get closer to a realistic appraisal of the problem of the legion and of Marcel Stomm's role in it through becoming acquainted with the course of his life, as well as through taking into consideration the impact of international ramifications.

Marcel Stomm was born in Vac on 24 December 1890, the first child of a Lutheran intelligentsia family. His father was Count Lajos Stomm, a land surveyor and appraiser in state service; his mother was Camilla Jaminsky, a teacher and the daughter of Marcel Jaminsky, a chief land surveyor and appraiser. The Stomm family was of English (Scottish ?) origin: at the time of the Thirty Years' War, some of its members wound up as soldiers in the German Reich. After the conclusion of the war, the members of the family settled in the Reich, with the majority of them continuing to serve as soldiers. For his military and diplomatic services, Emperor Joseph II raised one of them to the rank of imperial count. Marcel Stomm's grandfather was descended from this branch, and he came from Austria to Hungary in the 1850's as a land surveyor and appraiser. He established himself in Upper Hungary, where, through his wife, Berta Okolicsanyi, and by means of purchase he acquired 1200 holds of property. Because of various financial transactions, however, he was soon forced to part with the property.

In the Stomm family the blood of English, German, Croat, Polish, and Hungarian heroes was mixed. Because of the frequent transfers of Lajos Stomm, a state official, his son Marcel pursued his academic studies in numerous places. He started elementary school in 1896 in Nyitra, where he studied for three years. He finished the fourth year of elementary school and the first two years of the modern secondary school in Kassa. Then followed Temesvar, where he completed the third and fourth years. He was an outstanding student throughout. Then on the decision of his parents he was admitted to the Military Academy of the Royal Hungarian Army at Pecs. Although by his own admission he was more attracted to a career as a mechanical engineer, he chose the military profession on the parents' decision--in which in all certainty the opportunity for a free education, the memory of military traditions alive in the family and the status of a career as an officer were instrumental.

In the military academy, too, Marcel Stomm was an outstanding student, and his commanders recommended his admission to the Ludovika Academy. He passed the final examination necessary for this at the Temesvar modern secondary school with a good grade. In 1908 he began his studies at the Ludovika Academy, on a state scholarship, and he completed five out of six semesters as the first in his class. His teachers evaluated his character this way: "Determined, strong-willed, ambitious, having a strong sense of duty, trustworthy, having a good influence." Concerning his behavior one may read the following in the Class register: "Exemplary, very modest, very well-mannered, possessing purposeful ambition." The characterization of his diligence and of his abilities: "Very good aptitude, possessing quick comprehension, a nimble memory, a precise delivery. Very diligent."

On 18 August 1911, he was the first of his age group to be promoted to infantry lieutenant, with the number in rank of one. He commenced his professional military service as a platoon-leader in the 9th Kassa Honved Infantry Regiment. In 1912 he taught in the regiment's one-year volunteer school, while already in the following year he successfully passed on entrance examination for the higher army officers' course at Budapest, the completion of which opened the way for army officers to the Vienna War College, which offered qualification for the general staff. To refresh and reinforce his knowledge of the German language, Stomm was transferred in November 1913 to the Imperial and Royal 73rd Infantry Regiment stationed in Eger (Bohemia). In 1914 he returned to the 9th Infantry Regiment, with which he headed for the front after the outbreak of the First World War. He spent 42 months altogether in various military theaters. For his military achievements he received the military Cross of Merit 3rd Class With War Decorations and Swords, as well as the bronze and silver "Signum laudis" With Swords. In 1917 he completed the general staff course at Laibach as a captain.

During the revolutions he did service as an officer in the Szekely Division. In April 1919 he was captured by the Romanians, but he escaped in June along with a fellow-officer, and at the end of the month reported at Szeged to the counter-revolutionary government's armed force that was then being organized. He was assigned to the operational staff of the war ministry. At that time he became acquainted with Horthy, whose loyal follower he became.

After the coming to power of the counter-revolution Stomm became one of the first students of the newly-organized Military Academy, which he successfully finished in 1921. He worked in Department D. (peace-making) of the Office of Permanent Undersecretary in the defense ministry, while between 1924 and 1927 he taught tactics and army organization at the Ludovika Academy. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1925 he passed the general staff field officers' examination with a "B," and on 1 May 1926 he was promoted to major on general staff service. From the Ludovika Academy he moved in July of 1927 to the VI-2nd (Army General Staff 2nd) department of the defense ministry, from where, however, he was already ordered in November to six month's

language study in London. After completion of his duty assignment he assumed direction of the Yugoslav sub-department of the VI-2nd department of the defense ministry, but already after scarcely a year's time he was able to perfect his knowledge of French in Paris. His foreign duty assignments served as preparation for military attache service. In May 1930 he returned home from Paris, at which time he was appointed commander of the Budapest battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment. His six months' troop service--as with every previous assignment--ended with an outstanding record of service. He then served again in the VI-2nd department of the defense ministry, and prepared for further military attache assignments. In February 1931 he assumed his post in London, where he dealt with Washington, as well. During his time of service in England, lasting for three years, he lived with his London relatives, and never once went to Washington. He lived a retiring life; his regularly-dispatched reports were scarcely distinguished from the reports of the other military attaches, although he was upbraided several times for not sending reports of significant events to the General Staff. While still on duty abroad he was promoted to lieutenant colonel on general staff service.

After his return home in the spring of 1934 he was named commander of the I Division of the 7th Kecskemet Infantry Regiment; on 1 November 1936 he became a colonel and simultaneously he was transferred out of the general staff. At that time he was named to the post of ordnance officer of the 7th Infantry Regiment. From 1 May 1937 to 1 August 1939 he was commander of the 7th Infantry Regiment, then of the 14th Infantry Brigade. On 1 September 1940 he was named a general. He took part in the occupation of Upper and Lower Hungary. Even after the joining of the war against the Soviet Union he served as brigade commander, in a peace garrison.

So far, Marcel Stomm's life course followed the "standard career" of a person belonging to the military elite of the counter-revolutionary period, of an officer who served the policy of the counter-revolutionary system according to the best of his abilities, without reservations. He agreed with the aspirations of the system and with its aims, and in spite of his Anglophile outlook he accepted the German orientation of the ruling circles. In the fall of 1942 he was considered for corps commander in the 2nd Hungarian Army fighting on the Don. He accepted this post as an honor, and on 5 December 1942 he assumed command of the III Army Corps from Lieutenant General Janos Domotor.

The conditions that greeted Marcel Stomm on the battle-front were such that he could not have had any doubts concerning the fate of his corps in the event of a possible Soviet attack. When the Soviet attack launched on 12 January 1943 cut his troops off from the 2nd Hungarian Army, and with the agreement of Colonel-General Gusztav Jany he became directly subordinate to the Germans, for two weeks he accepted from his new superior, Lieutenant General Siebert, the role of a rear guard condemned to destruction. While fulfilling this role he and his troops suffered a series of injustices at the hands of the Germans, and he suddenly realized the utter senselessness and hopelessness of continuing the battle. He arrived at a parting of

the ways: in order to save his men, he refused further obedience to Siebert's orders, accepting thereby the possibility of an armed confrontation, as well, or of laying down arms before the Soviet forces. Realistically, he could figure on these two solutions. Brigadier General Stomm, however, chose a third way, which he conveyed to his subordinates in an order from corps headquarters issued at Krasznoje Olin on 1 February 1943:

"Starting from 12 January 1943 the Royal Hungarian III Army Corps has fought battles full of heavy casualties to hold the Don positions. Having been separated from the Royal Hungarian 2nd Army as a consequence of the breakthrough at Uriv, the "Korpsgruppe" became subordinated to Siebert. Under his command, for more than 12 days it insured the necessary time for the systematic retreat of the German 2nd Army.

"In the battles the Hungarian troops displayed superhuman heroism. The increasing lack of replacement ammunition and rations, coupled with the unusually severe cold, broke the stamina of the defenders. From this moment we represented merely a liability for the German military leadership. I repeatedly informed my superior commander of the situation of my forces, requesting their withdrawal, and their rest and reorganization in a more rearward position. Unfortunately this has not happened, but they have suffered through the terrible nights of the Russian winter on the bare snow, without ammunition, food or shelter. I have seen that your bodily and spiritual energies are dwindling day by day, and that all of us face certain destruction.--The German military leadership has still not been able to guarantee even rations.

"Today I received the order from General Siebert to lead you over the Olin stream to the territory lying to the west, where we can break through toward the west--through the Russian army, which not even the fully armed, fully battle-ready divisions of the German army could do.

"I cannot transmit this order to you, because it is senseless that thousands of utterly frozen, starving Hungarians be destroyed, 10-cartridge rifle by 10-cartridge rifle, with empty stomachs, helplessly.

"Recently the German military leadership issued the order to receive soldiers wanting to fight and perform service for the German army; it treats them as it does the sons of other peoples in service.

"In the history of the Hungarian people it has occurred many times in a similar situation that it has broken through to a still-unbelievable distance under the leadership of certain daring commanders.

"After this I am compelled to entrust the future of each of you to his own discretion, since I cannot give you rations, ammunition or a task to be carried out.

"The Hungarian fatherland will always remember with grateful affection its heroic sons whose fate only few in the Hungarian nation have suffered.

Farewell, Hungarian soldiers.

Maj Gen Count Stomm
Cps Cmndr"

With his dramatic-sounding order, which stands without equal in Hungarian military history and may also be taken for an indictment, General Stomm essentially disbanded his corps and left his soldiers to their fate. This was the desperate decision of a man come to a crisis, a man who had fallen to pieces under the load of military and political responsibility weighing on him in a critical situation. He did not want to subject his soldiers to further senseless destruction, and he had the courage to refuse the order of his German superior. Stomm's decision, however, did not stem from military behavior, for a commander may never, under any circumstances, abandon his troops. From his order, on the other hand, it appears quite unambiguous that he did not regard himself as the kind of "daring commander" who was capable of leading his men out of encirclement. That he should turn against the Germans, however, or lay down arms before the Soviet forces and take the inevitable political consequences of either step, was beyond his strength. His order is a startling testament to his human integrity; his unparalleled decision, however, was merely an ambivalent step under the circumstances.

After issuing the order, Stomm started with his smaller troupe in the western direction indicated by Lieutenant General Siebert, and on 3 February 1943--his feet frozen--he was captured by the Soviets. He was informed of his appointment as lieutenant general while a prisoner of war.

The catastrophe of the 2nd Hungarian Army gave a new impetus to the anti-fascist movement developing by this time among the Hungarian soldiers and officers being held as prisoners-of-war by the Soviets. In the March 1943 number of IGAZ SZO, the paper of the prisoners-of-war, there appeared the appeal "In the Name of 40,000 Prisoners-of-War" by Reserve First Lieutenant Ferenc Gallyas. Not long after, IGAZ SZO published the initiative of the officers of Prisoner-of-War Camp 74 for the formation of a Hungarian National Committee on the model of the National Committee for a Free Germany created by German prisoners-of-war. They intended the committee to have the role of organizing a Hungarian anti-fascist military formation from prisoners-of-war applying voluntarily, which would join the war of liberation against fascism on the side of the Soviet forces. In the decision, the Polish and Czechoslovak examples floated before the eyes of the Hungarian anti-fascists--albeit the circumstances of the formation of both the Polish and the Czechoslovak unit little resembled the circumstances of the Hungarian legion whose formation was desired. An initiative otherwise similar to the Hungarian also began among Romanian prisoners-of-war.

Keeping the common interests of the anti-fascist coalition in view and working for the continual strengthening of the alliance, the Soviet government supported the anti-fascist initiatives, the movement of prisoners-of-war of various nationalities. At the same time it could not disregard the special interests of its allies--Great Britain and the United States.

(It is well-known that neither Roosevelt nor Churchill was enthusiastic about the establishment on the territory of the Soviet Union of organized Polish and Czechoslovak formations or of the Romanian formation that--through Benes' powerful support--came into existence later.

In the matter of the Hungarian legion that was to be set up, however, the Anglo-Saxon powers, bound to their Yugoslav and Czechoslovak allies, represented, it may be said, a hostile viewpoint. (Benes, the president of the emigre Czechoslovak government, also rendered significant "services" in this). Although the following memorandum was not prepared in connection with the legion, it well suggests the British viewpoint in Hungarian matters: "while Hungary carries on its war against our allies and aids the Axis, it may not count on either sympathy or consideration." The Soviet government also had the kind of reservations that could have affected the question of the legion. We may read the following in a letter of Molotov, the Soviet Union's People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, forwarded to A.C. Kerr, the British ambassador to Moscow, on 27 June 1943: "The Soviet government believes that for this armed assistance that Hungary has afforded Germany, as well as for those murders and acts of violence, lootings and outrages, which they have committed in the occupied territories, not only the Hungarian government, but to a greater or lesser extent the Hungarian people, as well, must bear the responsibility."

In spite of the responsibility being cast in this form, the Soviet government was not averse, either, to supporting Hungarian anti-fascist efforts. Yet despite this support, external conditions were not favorable, either, to the anti-fascist movement of the Hungarian prisoners-of-war. The organizers of the movement attempted to alter this situation by the creation of internal conditions that were believed to be suitable--thus the person of Marcel Stomm became a key figure.

Lieutenant General Stomm understood that Germany could not win the war, and that a catastrophe awaited Hungary if it did not break with Hitler in time. He recognized that it was necessary to act toward this end, and he did not stand in the way of those wanting to act; what is more, he assured them of his support. One month after the appeal of the officers of Prisoner-of-War Camp 74, the 29 July 1943 number of IGAZ SZO published the "Declaration" of Lieutenant General Stomm and Brigadier General Deseo, which inter alia contained the following:

"1. As the officers most senior in rank being held as Soviet prisoners-of-war, we acknowledge and approve of that decision of our subordinates that Hungarian prisoner-of-war officers and men do their share in the formation of the Hungarian National Committee, with the aim that Hungary immediately break with Germany, that it assist our fatherland in concluding the lost war and in laying the foundations of a happier Hungarian future.

"2. The rapid rate of development of military and political events makes the performance of this task of national salvation extraordinarily necessary. ...Our homeland may before long become a battlefield, if we do not withdraw

from the war without delay....Fellow soldiers! Hungarian prisoner-of-war officers and men! Let us stand united in this work of saving the homeland, whose goal is the soonest possible conclusion of the war, and simultaneously with this the creation of an independent and free Hungary. Our life and our blood for the fatherland!"

After the appearance of the Declaration the organizers of the prisoner-of-war movement started negotiations with Stomm: he should undertake to lead the Hungarian legion that was to be set up. This could have involved only a nominal role, for he was not fit for actual leadership, owing to his incapacity (his leg had been amputated). The Rakosi-led Communist group (the Moscow committee of the Central Committee), in agreement with other leading personalities of the anti-fascist movement, believed that if Lieutenant General Stomm, known for his Anglophile outlook, were ready to lend his name to the organization of the legion, the easing of the anxieties of the Anglo-American allies was to be hoped for more realistically and the overcoming of their objections to be anticipated more readily. This could have been the reason for the oft-mentioned "general-condition," with which the Communist emigration wanted to offer support to the Soviet government, and to the organization of the legion, respectively.

According to the recollections of several one-time participants, Marcel Stomm was ready under certain conditions to assume the nominal leadership of the legion. Among these conditions there figured the recognition of the legion by the western allies and loyalty to the oath given to Horthy. The Soviet Union--given the knowledge of its obligations to its western allies and the antipathies it harbored toward Hungary--could not take on the representation of Lieutenant General Stomm's conditions. The Communist emigration, as well as Rakosi personally, knew this when it wished for, and then demanded, opposition to Horthy from the participants in the anti-fascist movement. This was not a total lack of diplomatic sense and a gratuitous rigidity on his part--as many believe--but behavior dictated by the realities and by necessity.

The organization of the Hungarian National Committee mobilized the prisoners-of-war for the struggle against Hitlerite fascism, but they did not take a stand against the person of the regent. Beyond a doubt this facilitated the mass of soldiers and the majority of officers receiving the organization of the legion sympathetically. Because of what preceded it, however, the Communist emigration was forced to put the prisoners-of-war, and mainly the officers, at a crossroads on this question. This was what Rakosi had in view in his address entitled "Horthy Is Responsible," given on 7 September 1943 before delegates of the anti-fascist movement of Hungarian prisoners-of-war gathered at Prisoner-of-War Camp 74 at Krasznogorszki.

Generals Marcel Stomm and Laszlo Deseo left the address, thus indicating that even under the given circumstances the oath given to Horthy was binding on them. Their behavior as a matter of course also determined the standpoint of the decisive majority of prisoner-of-war officers. The opinion of those among them who agreed with the objectives of the anti-fascist

movement was formulated most clearly by the Reserve First Lieutenant Ferenc Gallyas mentioned above. Gallyas believed it was not correct to insist on turning against Horthy as long as it was to be hoped that the break with Germany could be worked out under his leadership.

Clinging to this illusion, Stomm and the decisive majority of prisoner-of-war officers following his example were loyal to the oath they took to Horthy, which in the end made it impossible for the organizers of the anti-fascist prisoner-of-war movement to be able successfully to represent the matter of the legion.

In the fall of 1943, therefore, the anti-fascist prisoner-of-war movement was not able to create the kind of internal conditions for the organization of the Hungarian legion that could have influenced the unfavorable external circumstances in a positive direction. Then as well as later, the linkage of Stomm, Deseo, and the decisive majority of prisoner-of-war officers to Horthy and his system proved stronger than the requirements imposed by the historical situation. It would lead far afield and exceed the limits of this essay even to sketch those deeply rooted reasons for the Hungarian officer corps' having proved inadequate to recognize and understand these requirements in 1943 and later, in the fall of 1944. Here we will limit ourselves merely to noting that in the fall of 1943 the contradiction among the external and internal conditions for the establishment of the Hungarian legion proved insoluble, and this initiative, of such great significance from the viewpoint of the later development of the whole Hungarian resistance movement, was thwarted.

In a memorandum prepared on 31 October 1951 Marcel Stomm explained his behavior in this way:

"As far as my behavior in Camp 27 (near Moscow) is concerned, it was affected by my entire difficult situation at that time, the complete weakness and consequent ability to function only slowly mentally, as well, immediately after a second amputation and pneumonia, and the wish to keep away from any movement except what was healthy for such a seriously disabled person as I was. However, in no case was I averse to the kind of action that I thought might be useful to my country. It may be that I proceeded more slowly in this than would have been necessary, but disregarding the state caused by my serious physical condition, I am a very reflective type of man. I consider it essential that I agreed with completely and signed the declaration that Comrade Ministers (sic !) Zoltan Vass and Erno Gero felt to be expedient. My action surrounding the setting up of the Hungarian legion--with which, furthermore, I was in agreement--was influenced by my condition, which had once again become serious, and in consequence of which I had to be taken to a hospital. Psychologically, moreover, a depression caused by my condition afflicted me and only after a third operation had been performed in 1945 did I more or less recover."

Stomm's explanation, understandable in human terms, must, we believe, be supplemented a bit. Above all, we remind the reader that the anti-fascist movement did not expect him actually to lead the legion, but laid a claim

to his name. We can seek the real (and, for understandable reasons, unacknowledged in the fall of 1951) reason for his behavior not in his actual serious physical condition, but in the fact that, for him, Hungary meant the Hungary and system of Horthy, with which he was not yet about to break in the fall of 1943. Naturally, the prisoners-of-war who were ready to take up the matter of the legion noted with bitterness the thwarting of the initiative, and some of them blamed Stomm for the fiasco.

This is the reason that the general was rather isolated during what followed. Shortly after Horthy's unsuccessful effort to break away on 15 October 1944 and Szalasi's coming to power, however, he spoke out again. Along with Laszlo Deseo, he issued the following appeal on November 9:

"Hungarian Brothers--Soldiers and Citizens! We have reached the saddest and most shameful chapter in Hungarian history, which may be disastrous for the fate of our fatherland. Hitler's villainous system and the rebellion of traitorous renegade pro-Germans had made it impossible for our fatherland to be able to withdraw from the war in an orderly and systematic manner. Hitler's Gestapo agents and Szalasi's stooges are leading the Hungarian people to destruction in order to satisfy their personal ambition--and what is more--to the planned annihilation of the Hungarian nation.

"This cannot be permitted to happen; we have reached the final moment when we can still do something about our fate. Today there is no political leadership in Hungary! The time has arrived when every soldier is obligated to think politically, because he is not bound by oath. Oaths given to Szalasi are not valid, because they are unconstitutional and immoral.

"Let every patriotic citizen do his duty. Form free detachments, make the tactics of the Germans impossible. Do not give the German army food, sabotage the orders of Szalasi and Hitler!

"He who sides with Szalasi is a traitor.

"Follow Petofi's words and show that you do not want to be slaves."

The appeal came too late; it could not alter developments. The patriotic officers--held as prisoners-of-war and matured into anti-fascists--regarded themselves as absolved from the oath given to Horthy--which was the greatest psychological burden on them--and knew or felt what they owed their country. After the signing of the armistice agreement 80 officers started home in this spirit in February 1945, to take part in the organization of the new Hungarian army. The decisive majority of those at home, however, did not follow the appeal either of Marcel Stomm, nor of Bela Miklos and Janos Voros, nor of the Temporary National Government. Their link to the counter-revolutionary system put the bulk of them, without any special conflict of conscience, on the side of Szalasi, who had come to power by a putsch, and Horthy himself, by his resignation, which produced the appearance of legality, facilitated this for them.

Marcel Stomm returned home from captivity on 16 May 1951. Shortly after his interrogation he was placed in preliminary detention, and an investigation was begun against him: on account of "continually committed war crimes" the Budapest military prosecutor's office prepared an indictment in his case. The charges: the murder by shooting of five civilian individuals in Szabadka at the time of the occupation of Southern Hungary, forcing the III Corps to fight during the retreat from the Don, and the personally-ordered execution of several fleeing soldiers at the end of 1942. The thwarting of the establishment of the Hungarian legion did not figure among the charges. Given knowledge of the circumstances, however, we are scarcely mistaken that the behavior he displayed in the question of the legion made him suitable for the role of scapegoat, and in the period of distortions this was the chief reason for his prosecution. This is suggested by the fact that, although the Szabadka crime could not be proved and he was acquitted of the charge of executing the soldiers, a death sentence was handed down in his case. After several hearings the Presidential Council commuted the judgement to life imprisonment, out of clemency; then after a retrial the military court sentenced Stomm to 12 years' loss of liberty. On 6 August 1954 he was released from the prison at Vac, by reason of clemency. After his release he lived a retired life until his death on 25 April 1968.

8971

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POLAND

LORANC DISCUSSES PZPR CONFERENCE DECLARATION

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 1 Aug 84 p 3

[Interview with Wladyslaw Loranc, director of the Central Committee's Ideological Department, by Anna Pawlowska]

[Text] [Question] In the autumn, the new year of general party education is to begin with the declaration of National Conference of PZPR Delegates: "What are we fighting for, what is our goal?" This document, in different versions, was at least twice the subject of party-wide discussion, and hence the question: why again?

[Answer] If for no other reason than that only as a result of the approval of the conference did this project become a party document. I do not want to repeat the long history of its development. It is sufficient to bear in mind that this declaration is in fact the result of a very broad party-wide discussion and in a sense represents the party's sum total of collective experiences. It is especially impossible to overestimate the role of the first of those discussions, in the spring of 1982. It really helped the party to get on its feet: it limited the ideological and sometimes also the political disorientation, still frequent among us at that time. It assisted the understanding of the complex conditions of our actions, it facilitated the recognition of our adversary and the evaluation of his actual objectives.

[Question] You are continually talking about the discussion that preceded the declaration. And what about the document itself?

[Answer] In its final version it is first of all a statement of the party's objective, in accordance with its title. It also is, very importantly, a confirmation of the position of the Ninth Congress and a proclamation of the intent to realize it as a fact of life consistently. This affords the party's actions a certain ideological leeway--before working out a prospective program which will be considered at the Tenth Congress. And so the functions of the declaration are not insignificant even today. But its significance is not limited to the party alone. It is now time for one more reminder: the party itself, through the voice of the Central Committee but also other participants in the discussion in primary party organizations has decided that this should become a declaration of the whole party and not only of just a central unit, directed not only to members of the party, but to the entire society.

[Question] It would be difficult to defend the idea that has it reached society, that it has achieved some wider social resonance.

[Answer] This is the crux of the matter. Even if we decide that this document has already fulfilled its role vis-a-vis the party, the clearer becomes the role it can and should fulfill with respect to the whole of society. I also think that previously, let's say before the National Conference, the objective conditions for it did not yet exist, there was no definite social need for this kind of presentation by the party of its goals, strategies and tactics.

[Question] What in your opinion can a non-party reader find in the declaration, what can there be of interest to him, to win him over, to convince him, as you called it, of the party's intentions?

[Answer] This is a very fair but also difficult question, if only because "non-party reader" is a broad, comprehensive, all-encompassing definition. But I still hope that the contents of this document can ease some of the worries and doubts shared by certain social groups. I don't want to review or discuss here the contents of the declaration, thought by thought or phrase after phrase. I shall only draw your attention to three points.

First: Our heritage and tradition, which we consider our own. The declaration states that the year 1944 came as a result of many decades of revolutionary struggle of the Polish working class, that the party has the tradition and experiences of whole generations of fighters who left us the legacy of the truth about the indissoluble bond between the struggle for social liberation and the struggle for national liberation. Bitter experiences teach us how frail is national independence without the solution of the social problem. This should also serve as an indirect answer to the recently expressed criticism of the "premature seizing of power."

Second: The working class character of the party. This means that the party strengthens the role of the working class in society, that in selecting the goals of its actions it gives priority to the working class' interests, and also knows how to win allies for the working class and its interests. And so the decisive role of the working class is not directed against any group of working people. Here I am reminded of the thought of Stanislaw Brzozowski, who at the beginning of this century warned the intelligentsia that anyone trying to achieve something without consideration for the working class problem will spend his life living in a dream world.

Third and finally: Preservation of peace. Proof that the present bitter anticommunist crusade does not aim exclusively at the real socialist regime. Or, in other words, that aiming at this regime it threatens the existence of humanity, provokes a total war.

I believe that these two ideas contained in the declaration--the long, old and rich tradition of socialism in Poland, the non-antagonistic relations between the interests of labor and those of other working people's classes, and then the class character of the threat to peace--may in a sense put the

experiences of our society in the right perspective on the historical level, social level, and political level. They may alleviate the social fears that are being still cunningly fed by some centers of ideological subversion. And what is most important--they can enhance people's trust in the party.

[Question] You are probably right. These and similar problems are still being discussed in Poland now. But do we really have a chance of interfering in those discussions with our declaration?

[Answer] If we should decide that we have no right to interfere, to "mix in," as you call it, the discussion of the Polish people, then all our actions would make no sense. Besides, we obviously are "mixing in"! Each one of us, members of the party, is doing it every day within his own environment. We are doing it through the work of Marxist scholars and popularizers, through works of art enriched by socialist values. But clearly, reaching the entire society with exactly this sum total of ideas about the party and its goals, as stated in the declaration, still remains a task to be undertaken and fulfilled. And it won't be done by itself. A conscious effort of all basic party organizations is necessary, primarily an intellectual effort of the propaganda aktiv. Hence, among other things, the repeated return of the declaration to the party, and then immediately to the entire society. This time it should be read as an aid, a preparation to a broader approach to the people by the party, with the truth about the party's goals and intentions, and also with the party's guarantees for the future.

A broad, intelligent party dialogue, open to human doubts and hesitations, a dialogue stemming from the declaration, may and should become a real element of our policy of reconciliation, in this situation where we have made the subsequent important step, which proves that in our case actions don't belie words.

12470

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WESTERN JOURNALIST CONTRASTS BOSNIAN, KOSOVO MUSLIMS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 10 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Viktor Meier: "More and More Yugoslav Muslims Studying in Arab Countries--Belgrade Afraid of Fundamentalism"]

/Text/ Vienna, 9 Aug 84--The strengthening of Islam in Yugoslavia appears to be causing the regime increasing concern. Recently the chairman of the state Commission for Religious Questions in Serbia, Novakovic, deplored the infiltration of fundamentalist trends from abroad. Despite the fact that it is possible to engage in solid Islamic studies at the madrasa, the school for religious scholars, and the Islamic Theological Faculty in Sarajevo, he says, more and more young Yugoslav Muslims go abroad to study--"without the assent of the Islamic Religious Community." In Syria alone, there were at present 43 such students from Yugoslavia. It was easy for them to get scholarships in Muslim countries--something that was not always possible in Yugoslavia. What is interesting in this regard is that only a few years ago young Muslims in Yugoslavia were encouraged to study in Islamic countries abroad in order to serve as a "bridge" to nonaligned countries, whereas now it seems this is considered rather dangerous.

Writing about the Islamic question in Yugoslavia, the journal NIN states that the building of new mosques "in a worrisome way" is increasingly assuming the "character of a competition." Financial aid was being received from abroad, with "state offices not always having full insight into the extent and nature of this aid." The Islamic community for Kosovo, through the ra'is al-'ulama in Sarajevo (the highest Islamic dignitary in Yugoslavia), had received a million dollars from the Islamic Bank for building the new premises of the madrasa in Pristina. Further, NIN complains about the "eloquence" of the mufti of Belgrade, Jusuf Spahic, who has come into conflict with the authorities on several previous occasions. It appears that the mufti is having some success with his (provable) thesis that the word Islam is related to "salam" (peace). Consequently, he says, Islam is a "religion of peace and tolerance."

In Yugoslavia there are about 4 million Muslims--about half in Bosnia and half in Kosovo and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar. Accordingly there are two Islamic centers--in Sarajevo and in Pristina. In Bosnia, Muslims because of their cultural and political tradition also consider themselves a nation, while the Albanians in Kosovo regard themselves primarily as Albanian and only secondarily

as Muslims. The official leadership of the Muslim community in Sarajevo promotes a rational "European" Islam and likewise is upset by fundamentalist trends. It appears, however, that the trial of important representatives of the Islamic community in Bosnia-Herzegovina which took place about a year ago also undermined the position of the leadership of the Islamic community. Since the communist authorities, with a Stalinist police mentality, grouped the members of highly-varied trends within the Islamic community in a single "amalgam" and condemned them as a group, these trends everywhere formed closer ties with one another. In addition the behavior of the authorities universally strengthened the prestige of the more extreme trends among the Islamic population and also compelled the official leadership of the Islamic community to lend stronger support to interests of their faith lest they lose prestige among the faithful.

In Kosovo, the Islamic community--that is, the imams and religious scholars--in 1981 and thereafter strongly opposed the national movement among the Albanians, evidently considering it a competing force. As a result the hojas in Kosovo and Macedonia, including their madrasa in Pristina, remained without sizable influence in Albanian intellectual life. Now there are signs of a change, however. In Pristina, an election was to take place of a new supreme head of all Muslims of the Serbian Republic, of which Kosovo is a part. The authorities proposed the mufti of Pristina, Adilli, but at an assembly of all Serbian hojas he was defeated by the mufti of the town of Gnjilane, one of the centers of the Albanian national movement in Kosovo. Despite pressure by the authorities, the ra'is al-ulama in Sarajevo confirmed this election of Mufti Bajrami. Grotesquely, the journal NIN, evidently displeased at this development, took the election of Bajrami as an occasion for deploring a "lack of internal democracy" in the Islamic community.

In other respects too the advance of Islam in a number of Yugoslav localities is causing trouble. In Belgrade and Ljubljana the building of mosques time and again is meeting with difficulties. The newly-built mosque in Zagreb some weeks ago fell victim to a fire whose origin has not yet been established. This event aroused negative feelings among the population in Yugoslavia. Incidentally, the regime also became involved in contradictions by claiming that this mosque in Zagreb was the first one to have been built there. This is not the case. The first mosque in Zagreb was built in World War II under the Ustashi regime, which extolled the Muslims as the "flower of the Croatian people." The building in question is the circular building in the eastern part of the downtown area of Zagreb which continues to be representational and is used as a place for exhibitions.

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